基准安全、实践不安全：1331 起儿童相关 AI 事件的教训

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Abstract:AI systems are increasingly present in children's everyday environments: education, entertainment, social networks, and toys. Their safety is typically assessed at the model level, through benchmarks, red-teaming, and content filtering. However, most AI harm taxonomies lack child-specific evidence and under-specify developmental harm and the stakeholder asymmetries unique to minors. Building on prior taxonomies, we construct a child-centered harm taxonomy mapped to sociotechnical failure modes. We curate and code 1331 publicly reported child-related AI incidents, annotating internal and external harm types and the failure mode implicated in each incident. Our analysis reveals which harms are most prevalent in public reporting, how individual-level and population-level harms relate, and which failures are most often coded alongside harm. We find that harm concentrates in representational, dignity-related, and psychological categories, and co-occurs most often with deployment-context, governance, and misuse failures rather than model defects. Harm to an individual child is also frequently linked to population-level harm, reaching children who never interacted with the system. These findings suggest that model-level evaluations, while necessary, cannot by themselves anticipate the harm pathways most often documented for children. We conclude with actionable implications emphasizing mitigations beyond model-level safeguards such as content filtering: age assurance, consent verification for depiction, safety-by-design UX constraints, incident disclosure norms, and auditing regimes targeting developmental risk. Privacy-minimized annotations, a codebook, and documentation are available at this https URL.

Submission history

From: Shrestha Mishra [view email]
[v1] Mon, 26 Oct 2026 01:50:27 UTC (328 KB)