LLM 中的隐蔽且可证明的文本不可见性：模型看不见什么

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Abstract:Text wrapped in a trigger can be made behaviorally invisible to a language model: omitted from summaries and quotations, ignored in question answering, and left unflagged by downstream filtering. We study this selective blindness as a dual-use information-flow primitive, a supply-chain backdoor, and a white-box auditing problem. We first implement it exactly as a serving-time span veto: blocking information flow out of a marked span makes every outside activation bit-identical under same-length substitution of the span's content, a noninterference property we verify across ten models, seven mixer families, and 0.5B-120B parameters. The veto serves as a deployable quarantine, an exact reference for calibrating leakage, and a teacher. Distilled into weights, it yields a backdoor: checkpoints trained on six model families from 4B to 120B ignore marked context at little benchmark cost, and their outputs show no measurable semantic trace of the suppressed content above the veto reference on our held-out suite; an in-domain variant suppresses planted vulnerabilities during AI code review. Detection is therefore a white-box problem. Simpler backdoors remain internally transparent -- linear probes recover suppressed content at 0.57-0.79 accuracy versus 0.025 chance -- but hardening the attack until probes reach chance collapses attention from outside the span into it below the range of base models. Across the attacks we evaluate, probe visibility trades off against routing visibility; we do not establish that this tradeoff is fundamental.

Submission history

From: Mark Russinovich [view email]
[v1] Sun, 11 Oct 2026 20:00:37 UTC (55 KB)