arXiv cs.AI· Leonhard Waibl, Felix Michalak, Hadrien Mariaccia·· 1 天前AI 评分58
BELLS-O:评估 LLM 监督系统的运营权衡
BELLS-O: Evaluating the Operational Trade-offs of LLM Supervision Systems
AI 导读
BELLS-O 是独立运营基准,评估来自 17 家开发者的 33 个系统,包括 Llama Guard 4、ShieldGemma-2B、Lakera Guard 等专用护栏,以及 GPT-5.4、Claude Sonnet 4.6、Grok 4.1 Fast 等被用作监督者的前沿通用模型,并同时比较检测率、误报率、延迟和成本。
正文 · 原文
Abstract:LLM supervision systems, namely input/output moderation filters and jailbreak detectors, are the primary safeguard against misuse in deployed AI applications, yet existing benchmarks are often vendor-biased, omit cost and latency, and rarely compare specialized guardrails against repurposed generalist LLMs. We present BELLS-O (Benchmark for the Evaluation of LLM Supervision Systems, Operational), an independent operational benchmark that evaluates 33 systems from 17 developers: specialized guardrails (e.g., Llama Guard 4, ShieldGemma-2B, Lakera Guard) and frontier generalists repurposed as supervisors (e.g., GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Grok 4.1 Fast), jointly on detection rate, false-positive rate, latency, and cost. We cover input/output moderation across 11 harm categories, jailbreak detection across 13 attack techniques, and prompt-injection detection, using in-house datasets built from handcrafted prompts, curated external samples, and quality-controlled synthetic generation, with synthetic moderation samples paraphrased to suppress generator fingerprints. Content-moderation runs are repeated five times and all rates reported with 95% intervals. The Pareto frontier reveals use-case-dependent tradeoffs. On content moderation, specialized supervisors are operationally ahead: top systems match the best generalist LLMs on detection (93-96%, no significant difference) at low false-positive rates while running ~5x faster; cost depends more on serving setup than on class. On jailbreak detection, generalist LLMs achieve higher median detection on three of four datasets and lower false-positive rates, but at higher latency and, for closed frontier models, 10-100x higher cost. On prompt injection, the two best dedicated detectors lead. We release the framework, an interactive leaderboard, and four datasets as a vendor-neutral basis for selecting safeguards under deployment constraints.
| Comments: | Accepted at NeurIPS 2026 (Track on Evaluations and Datasets). Previously presented at the ICML 2026 Workshop on Trustworthy AI for Good (AI4GOOD). 60 pages, 6 figures; 10-page main text plus appendices |
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2606.20668 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2606.20668v2 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.20668 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite |
Submission history
From: Hadrien Mariaccia [view email]
[v1]
Fri, 12 Jun 2026 07:25:12 UTC (690 KB)
[v2]
Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:59:32 UTC (272 KB)
来源:arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org