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arXiv cs.CL· Yunkai Dang, Wanyu Zhang, Meiyi Zhu, Qi Fan, Tianyu Ding, Wenbin Li·· 10 小时前AI 评分31

TERM:无需预设目标方向的熵引导残差调制越狱防御方法

TERM: Target-Free Jailbreak Defense via Entropy-Guided Residual Modulation

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研究者提出推理时越狱防御方法 TERM,通过提示词校准的注意力熵偏差引导模型对自身残差更新做自适应调制,无需预设安全方向。该方法在 Llama、Qwen、Gemma(含 0.6B 至 32B 的 Qwen3)上与七种防御方法、七种越狱攻击及两个过度拒答基准对比,在保持低过度拒答的同时提升越狱鲁棒性,推理开销适中。

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Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong capabilities across diverse applications, making both safety and utility essential for reliable deployment. Jailbreak attacks use diverse forms of adversarial prompting to bypass alignment safeguards and induce LLMs to generate harmful responses. Some representation-based defenses regulate internal activations using predefined steering directions or learned safety regions. However, adapting intervention to each input without a predefined representational target while limiting over-refusal remains a challenge. In this paper, we propose Target-free Entropy-guided Residual Modulation (TERM), an inference-time defense that uses prompt-calibrated attention entropy deviations to guide adaptive modulation of the model's own residual updates. Attention patterns vary across prompts and decoding steps, making raw entropy values difficult to interpret as a consistent signal for intervention. We therefore calibrate attention entropy against each prompt's own prefill baseline to establish an input-specific reference for reducing unnecessary intervention on benign requests. Adaptive scale normalization and temporal accumulation then account for differences in deviation scale and persistence to determine intervention strength. The resulting signal controls bounded scaling of the model's own residual updates, without relying on a predefined safety direction. We compare our method with seven defenses on seven jailbreak attacks and two over-refusal benchmarks across Llama, Qwen, and Gemma models, including Qwen3 models from 0.6B to 32B. Results show our method improves jailbreak robustness while maintaining low over-refusal on benign safety-sensitive requests with modest inference overhead.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2611.13577 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2611.13577v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.13577

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Yunkai Dang [view email]
[v1] Tue, 10 Nov 2026 04:52:10 UTC (2,391 KB)

来源:arXiv cs.CL · arxiv.org