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arXiv cs.AI· Chong Zeng, Ziqian Zhong, Kexun Zhang, Ivan Bercovich, Ivgeni Segal, Yuzhen Mao, Shashwat Saxena, Aditi Raghunathan·· 3 天前AI 评分39

面向智能体环境的可扩展弱到强验证器加固方法

Scalable Weak-to-Strong Verifier Hardening for Agent Environments

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研究者提出一种可扩展的全自动弱到强验证器加固方法,先建立智能体无法直接修改的隔离验证器沙箱,再用 hacker-fixer 循环发现并修复验证器漏洞。该方法应用于 Terminal Bench、KernelBench 和 SETA,大幅降低攻击成功率,且随循环迭代次数增加防御持续增强,优于静态非迭代基线。其早期版本已被 Terminal Bench 官方仓库采用,用于审计环境中的漏洞利用。

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Abstract:Agent environments are essential for large language model (LLM) development. They use programmatic verifiers to turn complex outcomes into rewards. Verifiers can be attacked into awarding full credit to cheating agents without completing the intended task, causing inaccurate evaluation and misalignment in training. As agent environments scale in numbers and difficulty, so must the repairing of exploitable verifiers. To this end, we ask whether today's model with scaled compute can automatically harden agent environments to prevent potentially stronger future models from reward hacking. We introduce a scalable, fully automatic approach to weak-to-strong verifier hardening. It first sets up an isolated verifier sandbox that agents cannot directly modify, then uses a hacker-fixer loop to find and repair remaining verifier vulnerabilities.
We apply this loop to Terminal Bench, KernelBench, and SETA, substantially reducing attack success across these agent environments. The iterative design scales with the hardening budget, producing progressively stronger defenses as the number of loop iterations increases and outperforming the static, non-iterative baseline. An earlier version of our hacker-fixer loop has been adopted by the official Terminal Bench repository as a way to audit exploits in its environments. Project page: this https URL.
Comments: Project page: this https URL
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
Cite as: arXiv:2610.15924 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2610.15924v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.15924

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Chong Zeng [view email]
[v1] Sun, 11 Oct 2026 21:10:19 UTC (175 KB)

来源:arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org