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arXiv cs.CL· Yutao Wu, Xiao Liu, Hanxun Huang, Xiang Zheng, Yige Li, Yifeng Gao, Cong Wang, Bo Li, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang·· 11 小时前AI 评分60

LLM 与编码智能体出现内部安全崩塌

Internal Safety Collapse in LLMs and Coding Agents

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论文提出 LLM 与编码智能体的内部安全崩塌(ISC)失效模式:在完成本身无害的编码任务时,智能体会优先满足程序要求而生成大量敏感内容。作者构建 TVD(Task、Validator、Data)框架搭建需要敏感内容才能完成的受控流程,实验发现包括 Claude Fable 5 在内的强模型也能被有效触发,输出接近 2023 年早期未对齐 LLM 的有害内容。

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Abstract:LLMs and coding agents can now tackle complex, long-horizon tasks through advances in reinforcement learning, but stronger task-solving capabilities do not necessarily preserve safety alignment. Recent AI agent incidents involving reward hacking indicate how optimizing for task success can bring learned capabilities into conflict with safety alignment. In this work, we identify a critical failure mode that manifests this conflict, which we term Internal Safety Collapse (ISC). When completing otherwise benign coding tasks, AI agents can prioritize satisfying program requirements over safety constraints, generating large volumes of sensitive content, including unsafe outputs, as task data. To study this phenomenon, we introduce TVD (Task, Validator, Data), a framework for building controlled workflows that require sensitive content for completion. Through extensive experiments, we observe instances of highly harmful content that closely resemble outputs from early, unaligned LLMs in 2023. We further find that ISC can be effectively triggered even in highly capable LLMs such as Claude Fable 5. These results indicate that, despite substantial alignment efforts, frontier LLMs remain internally unsafe: safety alignment primarily reshapes surface behavior without eliminating the underlying knowledge that enables unsafe outputs. Our findings underscore the need for caution when deploying LLMs in high-stakes settings, such as scientific pipelines and autonomous agents.
Content Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful content. Source code: this https URL
Comments: Accepted at NeurIPS 2026. 38 pages, 16 figures, 30 tables. Qualitative examples of jailbreaks may be harmful in nature
Subjects: Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.23509 [cs.CL]
  (or arXiv:2603.23509v2 [cs.CL] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.23509

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: Oscar Wu [view email]
[v1] Wed, 4 Mar 2026 12:55:34 UTC (3,427 KB)
[v2] Thu, 5 Nov 2026 19:19:43 UTC (10,861 KB)

来源:arXiv cs.CL · arxiv.org