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arXiv cs.CL· Jialin Song, Xiaodong Liu, Weiwei Yang, Mingqian Feng, Chengquan Guo, Qiyao Ma, Carolyn Buractaon, Anson Ho, Wuyang Chen, Christopher White·· 11 小时前AI 评分31

CoFiBreak:面向多轮越狱的由粗到细多样性奖励方法

CoFiBreak: A Coarse-to-Fine Diversity Reward for Effective Multi-Turn Jailbreak

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CoFiBreak 提出一种用于 GRPO 的由粗到细多样性奖励,在保持攻击有效性和低推理成本的同时提升多轮越狱攻击的多样性。以 Llama3.1-8B-Instruct 为受害模型训练后,在 HarmBench 上发现的不同细粒度成功策略数量为最强基线的 1.6-2.0 倍,在 AdvBench 上达到 98.8% ASR@10 且多样性得分为最强攻击基线的 2.1 倍。

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Abstract:Automated red teaming trains an attacker large language model (LLM) to elicit harmful responses from a victim LLM, but reinforcement learning can collapse attackers onto a narrow set of prompts when attack success is the only reward. Such a collapse of attack diversity can bias safety evaluation toward repeatedly testing near-duplicate attack patterns rather than the underlying harmful intents. Existing methods often trade off attack success or inference cost for greater content or strategy diversity. We propose CoFiBreak, a coarse-to-fine diversity reward for Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) that improves attack diversity while preserving strong attack effectiveness and low inference cost. The coarse reward broadens which strategies the attacker uses by encouraging strategies underrepresented within each GRPO group, while the fine reward broadens how those strategies are realized by discouraging reuse of the same personas, framings, and output formats after harmful-intent information is removed from prompt embeddings. Diversity rewards apply only to attacks that already exceed an effectiveness threshold, so diversity cannot be gained through ineffective attacks. Since both rewards are computed only during training, CoFiBreak also retains inference efficiency. Trained with Llama3.1-8B-Instruct as the victim, CoFiBreak discovers 1.6-2.0x as many distinct successful fine-grained strategies as the strongest baseline across frontier victims on HarmBench. It reaches 98.8% ASR@10 (attack success rate with 10 generations per intent) on AdvBench with the highest diversity score among all compared methods, which is 2.1x that of the strongest-attacking baseline. The resulting attacks transfer to unseen frontier LLMs, reaching 71.0% ASR@10 on AdvBench with the unseen victim Claude-Opus-4.6. The code will be released.
Comments: 10 pages main text, 24 pages total, 8 figures, 12 tables
Subjects: Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2610.40926 [cs.CL]
  (or arXiv:2610.40926v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.40926

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Jialin Song [view email]
[v1] Thu, 29 Oct 2026 19:51:36 UTC (706 KB)

来源:arXiv cs.CL · arxiv.org