SEEK：用演化知识对抗前沿科学智能体的技能提取攻击

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Abstract:Science agents increasingly package domain expertise as reusable skills that plan analyses, select tools, and execute workflows. This modularity creates a confidentiality risk: the interactions that deliver a skill's capability can also reveal the skill itself. We build an extensible benchmark of 40 protected skills across eight open- and closed-source science-agent platforms, comparing direct, fixed-strategy, and bandit-guided iterative probing under reference-based and reference-free evaluation. Leakage is pervasive: all eight platforms (100%) leak at least one protected skill, and four reach 100% attack success under a single direct request. To stress-test platforms that resist simple probing, we propose SEEK (Skill Extraction with Evolving Knowledge), a black-box, self-evolving red-teaming agent that consolidates response-derived evidence in persistent memory and evolves reusable attack skills, using only user-visible responses. On 12 skills from SpatialAgent and Biomni, SEEK achieves 100% attack success while reducing the mean first-success round by 31.8% and 38.2% relative to bandit-guided probing. Against a confidentiality policy that blocks all three benchmark protocols, SEEK still extracts one of six protected skills. These findings show that current science agents do not reliably protect their skills and that defenses must be evaluated against adaptive, multi-turn attackers.

Comments:	12 pages, 3 figures
Subjects:	Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as:	arXiv:2610.34365 [cs.LG]
	(or arXiv:2610.34365v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
	https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.34365 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Cheng Gui [view email]
[v1] Sun, 25 Oct 2026 15:19:13 UTC (4,341 KB)