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arXiv cs.AI· Yuchuan Fu, Minghe Wang, Xiaohan Yuan, Chenlin Zou, Kaitong Jia, Jinfeng Li, Dongxia Wang·· 10 小时前AI 评分38

RAS-Eval:基于规约的 LLM 智能体工具调用长程任务安全评估框架

Specification-based Security Evaluation of Real-World Agents Tool-Calling under Long-Horizon Context Tasks

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研究者提出 RAS-Eval,一个基于规约的 LLM 智能体安全评估框架,将效用与安全目标统一表达为工具调用轨迹和动态环境观测上的线性时序逻辑(LTL)规约,并用现成模型检查器验证,从而给出确定性判定、避免 LLM-as-a-Judge 与 Agent-as-a-Judge 的评估器不确定性。

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Abstract:As large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in long-horizon unattended scenarios, security evaluation of them before deployment becomes increasingly essential and challenging. Existing evaluation methods mainly follow the paradigms of LLM-as-a-Judge or Agent-as-a-Judge. However, such judges are themselves often vulnerable to hallucination and can even be affected by perturbations. Furthermore, because capturing full environment states at every step is often prohibitively expensive in open-ended environments, existing evaluations typically rely on textual logs and the final environment state. As a result, they may miss transient violations that are overwritten before the trajectory ends or never reflected in textual logs. We present RAS-Eval, a specification-based security evaluation framework for LLM agents. RAS-Eval uniformly expresses utility and security objectives as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) specifications over tool-call trajectories and dynamic environment observations, and verifies them with an off-the-shelf model checker. This design addresses both limitations above. First, unlike LLM-as-a-Judge and Agent-as-a-Judge, RAS-Eval derives deterministic verdicts from formally defined properties, eliminating evaluator-side uncertainty and remaining reliable even for long-horizon trajectories. Second, RAS-Eval observes exactly the states on which the verdict depends, making it affordable to monitor the environment throughout execution and detect transient violations that leave little trace in the logs or final environment state. Moreover, we design a multi-agent-based dataset construction pipeline. Using it, we construct a benchmark (this https URL) of 200 normal tasks and 800 attack tasks spanning four attack surfaces: indirect prompt injection, tool poisoning, skill code injection, and tool code injection.
Comments: 22 pages, 5 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2506.15253 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2506.15253v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2506.15253

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: Yuchuan Fu [view email]
[v1] Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:30:36 UTC (166 KB)
[v2] Tue, 10 Nov 2026 06:46:10 UTC (515 KB)

来源:arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org