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arXiv cs.CY· Stavros Anagnou, Christoph Salge, Peter R. Lewis·· 23 小时前AI 评分21

不确定性、偏差与制度启动问题:认知噪声如何降低合作临界规模

Uncertainty, bias and the institution bootstrapping problem

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研究提出“制度启动问题”:个体只有在制度建立后才愿参与,导致制度难以形成。作者将认知偏差、概率扭曲与感知噪声纳入博弈论框架,发现无偏感知噪声能大幅降低制度涌现所需的合作者临界规模,且感知多样性越高效果越强。比例性低估低概率惩罚与等量高估会产生不同结果,比例与绝对两类感知扭曲也带来定性不同的演化路径。

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Abstract:Institutions play a critical role in enabling communities to manage common-pool resources and avert tragedies of the commons. However, a fundamental issue arises: Individuals typically perceive participation as advantageous only after an institution is established, creating a paradox: How can institutions form if no one will join before a critical mass exists? We term this conundrum the institution bootstrapping problem and propose that misperception, specifically, agents' erroneous belief that an institution already exists, could resolve this paradox. By integrating well-documented psychological phenomena, including cognitive biases, probability distortion, and perceptual noise, into a game-theoretic framework, we demonstrate how these factors collectively mitigate the bootstrapping problem. Notably, unbiased perceptual noise (e.g., noise arising from agents' heterogeneous physical or social contexts) drastically reduces the critical mass of cooperators required for institutional emergence. This effect intensifies with greater diversity of perceptions. We explain this counter-intuitive result through asymmetric boundary conditions: proportional underestimation of low-probability sanctions produces distinct outcomes compared to equivalent overestimation. Furthermore, the type of perceptual distortion, proportional versus absolute, yields qualitatively different evolutionary pathways. These findings challenge conventional assumptions about rationality in institutional design, highlighting how "noisy" cognition can paradoxically enhance cooperation. Finally, we contextualize these insights within broader discussions of multi-agent system design and collective action. Our analysis underscores the importance of incorporating human-like cognitive constraints, not just idealized rationality, into models of institutional emergence and resilience.
Comments: Published as Anagnou, S., Salge, C., Lewis, P.R. (2026). Uncertainty, Bias and the Institution Bootstrapping Problem. In: Tzeng, ST., Dell'Anna, D., Sichman, J.S. (eds) Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, Norms, and Ethics for Governance of Multi-Agent Systems XVIII. COINE 2025. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 16253. Springer, Cham
Subjects: Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:2504.21579 [cs.MA]
  (or arXiv:2504.21579v2 [cs.MA] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2504.21579

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: Stavros Anagnou [view email]
[v1] Wed, 30 Apr 2025 12:36:06 UTC (6,752 KB)
[v2] Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:22:46 UTC (6,032 KB)

来源:arXiv cs.CY · arxiv.org