AmberCell:运行真实服务的高交互蜜罐
AmberCell is a high-interaction honeypot: it runs full, real services
AmberCell 是一款高交互蜜罐,直接运行 postfix、OpenLDAP、xrdp、kamailio 等真实开源服务而非模拟仿真,攻击者的每个数据包、凭据和载荷都被完整留存。它提供 28 个协议诱饵,基于 Docker Compose 单主机部署,采集器独占 netns 记录 pcap、原始流量与 JSONL 事件,证据经单向投递通道输出,SIEM 与分析人员只拉取、不接触蜜罐本体。
// high-interaction honeypot · real services · zero emulation
AmberCell is a high-interaction honeypot: it runs full, real services — actual postfix, OpenLDAP, xrdp, kamailio — not emulated look-alikes. Attackers interact with genuine daemons on a genuine network stack, and every packet, credential, and payload is preserved, sealed in amber.
/ CELL BOOT SEQUENCE /
utc —
the cells never sleep
high-interaction means the services are real — why that matters ↓
01 / WHAT IS A HONEYPOT — IN TWO DIALECTS
IN PLAIN TERMS
AmberCell is a decoy computer that looks like a real office network: mail servers, file shares, databases, even a remote-desktop login.
The difference from a movie prop: everything on it actually works. Attackers who break in get real software to interact with — and every move is recorded, like insects preserved in amber.
Nothing of yours is ever exposed, and the evidence leaves through a one-way letterbox.
FOR SECURITY PROFESSIONALS
- High-interaction by architecture: real OSS daemons in per-protocol cells — no fake shells, no scripted responses
- Single-host Docker Compose (Ubuntu 22.04 / Debian 12), host nftables ingress/egress
- Collector-owned netns capture: pcap + raw flows + JSONL events, append-only
- ATT&CK/Engage enrichment; bounded AI manager off the packet path with a deterministic critic
- Kill bars G1–G14 gate production exposure
- One-way dead drop — SIEM and analysts pull, they never touch the pot
meanwhile, in the web — an attacker who touches a cell is stuck in it:
no real data, no next hop, no way out. Every struggle is another frame of evidence, preserved.
02 / WHY HIGH-INTERACTION MATTERS
Honeypots are classed by how much of the service is real. AmberCell sits at the deep end — deliberately.
LOW-INTERACTION
Emulated protocol banners and handshakes only (honeyd-style). Cheap and safe, but an attacker fingerprinting the fake walks away in seconds — you learn almost nothing about what they intended to do.
MEDIUM-INTERACTION
Scripted emulation: fake shells and canned responses (cowrie-style). Better lures, still detectable — behaviour never quite matches a real system, and sophisticated tooling notices the seams.
HIGH-INTERACTION AMBERCELL
Full, real services. Attackers exploit, authenticate, upload and interact with genuine daemons on a real network stack — the deepest, most truthful evidence you can collect. AmberCell makes that safe to operate: every real daemon is sealed in its own cell with tight caps, seccomp and egress allowlists.
03 / 28 high-interaction protocol decoys
| protocol | port | proto | software | status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ftp | 21 | tcp | vsftpd | real |
| ssh | 22 | tcp | openssh | real |
| telnet | 23 | tcp | busybox | real |
| smtp | 25 | tcp | postfix | real |
| dns | 53 | udp+tcp | coredns | real |
| tftp | 69 | udp | dnsmasq | real |
| http | 80/443 | tcp | nginx | real |
| pop3 | 110 | tcp | dovecot | real |
| ntp | 123 | udp | chrony | beta |
| netbios | 137 | udp | nmbd | real |
| imap | 143 | tcp | dovecot | real |
| snmp | 161 | udp+tcp | net-snmp | real |
| ldap | 389 | tcp | openldap | beta |
| smb | 445 | tcp | samba | real |
| protocol | port | proto | software | status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| syslog | 514 | tcp+udp | rsyslog | beta |
| mqtt | 1883 | tcp | mosquitto | real |
| dockerapi | 2375 | tcp | mocked api | trap |
| mysql | 3306 | tcp | mariadb | real |
| rdp | 3389 | tcp | xrdp | real |
| sip | 5060 | tcp | kamailio | real |
| postgres | 5432 | tcp | postgresql | real |
| vnc | 5900 | tcp | tigervnc | real |
| redis | 6379 | tcp | redis | real |
| elastic | 9200 | tcp | elasticsearch | real |
| kubelet | 10250 | tcp | mocked api | trap |
| memcached | 11211 | tcp | memcached | real |
| ollama | 11434 | tcp | llm lure | mock |
| mongo | 27017 | tcp | mongodb | real |
/ FLOWS — packets per second, live
04 / YOUR DECOY, YOUR WAY — READY OR HOMEMADE
whatever you plug in — curated, homemade, or remote — the evidence pipeline stays identical
Every protocol cell speaks the same contract. Run a curated real daemon, bring your own, or tunnel to the servers you already operate — the collectors and evidence never change.
WAY 1
CURATED REAL DAEMONS
70+ digest-pinned open-source servers ship as one-env-var swaps:
AMBER_FTP_PROVIDER=proftpd, AMBER_SMTP_PROVIDER=exim,
AMBER_LDAP_PROVIDER=glauth… Each keeps the same evidence schema, so
switching never breaks your pipeline.
WAY 2
BRING YOUR OWN DOCKER
Already built the perfect lure? Point a cell at your image:
AMBER_FTP_HI_IMAGE=registry…@sha256:… (prebuilt) or
AMBER_FTP_PROVIDER_CONTEXT=/path/to/your/Dockerfile. Containment and
capture wrap around whatever you bring.
WAY 3
TUNNEL TO YOUR OWN SERVER
Have real services already? Relay a cell to them at any address:
AMBER_LDAP_PROVIDER=remote +
AMBER_LDAP_REMOTE_ADDR=ldap.corp:389. It's an L4 relay — bytes untouched,
evidence still captured at the cell front.
05 / HOW IT WORKS
STEP 1
DECOY
Real OSS daemons run in sealed cells behind nftables DNAT — a convincing, high-interaction network.
STEP 2
RECORD
Per-cell collectors own the netns: rotating pcap, raw flows, credentials, uploads — append-only.
STEP 3
EXAMINE
ATT&CK/Engage enrichment + bounded AI decisions; intelligence leaves via a one-way dead drop.
┌─────────────────────────── the sealed case ───────────────────────────┐ internet ───▶│ nftables DNAT ──▶ ambernet (icc off) ──▶ 28 real-service cells │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ ▼ │ │ egress allowlist dns sinkhole *-collector ──▶ /var/ambercell │ │ (tcp 80/443 only, (all lookups │ pcap · flows · JSONL │ │ tcp/25 dropped) logged) ▼ │ │ dead drop ◀ one-way letterbox │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ SIEM / analysts pull — never touch the pot
/ BEACON — the dead-drop publish cycle
06 / TUTORIALS — interactive, copy-ready, real
Every command is verified against the repo. Sessions run in an animated terminal — lines type themselves in, and every $ line copies on click.
~3 min
beginner
TUT·01
First flight — your first real honeypot
Clone, build amberctl, boot a real vsftpd cell, probe it, and watch your first evidence land. No public IP needed.
> open_session_
~2 min
beginner
TUT·02
Swap the decoy — providers & your own Docker
Switch vsftpd→proftpd with one variable, then bring a custom image. Evidence schema never changes; digests stay pinned.
> open_session_
~2 min
intermediate
TUT·03
Point a cell at YOUR server
Relay attackers into your existing LDAP/SNMP/SIP server at any address — the cell keeps capturing at the front.
> open_session_
~2 min
analyst
TUT·04
Take the intel — the dead drop
Publish an evidence bundle, verify it hash-by-hash, and pull it exactly like your SIEM would.
> open_session_
~4 min
operator
TUT·05
Deploy sensors — a remote fleet
Headless provisioning, systemd watchdog + publish timer, and a central launcher for many sensors.
> open_session_
07 / SAFETY — real services, hard limits
High-interaction means real risk if done naively. AmberCell's answer is layered containment — production exposure is gated by kill bars, and if any trips, you don't ship.
[✓] lab profile is the default [✓] no host orchestration, ever [✓] egress allowlist + dns sinkhole [✓] append-only evidence [✓] one-way dead drop
[✓] G1 no unexplained egress
[✓] G2 no lateral container reach
[✓] G3 no host/metadata access
[✓] G4 no docker.sock anywhere
[✓] G5 unknown traffic never dropped
[✓] G6 AI never mutates evidence
[✓] G8 traps can't orchestrate
[✓] G10 no outbound tcp/25
[✓] G13 no dns/memcached amplification
[✓] G14 relays can't widen egress
● AMBERCELL × CHN — you found one piece of the network
AmberCell runs perfectly as a standalone box — but it's part of Cyber Halluci Net (CHN), our security-research collective. The perfect complete free deception suite.
> try CHN at cyberhallucinet.org_
ready in ~30 seconds on a laptop — no public IP required for the lab.
来源:Hacker News · cyberhallucinet.github.io