arXiv cs.MA· Arin Mukhopadhyay, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panayiotis Danassis·· 2 天前AI 评分22
LLM 智能体实验揭示委托治理的规模-问责权衡与多中心结构
The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance
AI 导读
研究用重复博弈模型分析委托治理中的规模-问责权衡：选区越大成本分摊收益越高，但中心保留单个成员的价值随规模下降，个体退出只能支撑到内生的可问责选区规模，且完全委托的可问责治理在部分参数区间必然是多中心的。
正文 · 原文
Abstract:Many collective-action systems are neither fully decentralized nor fully centralized: agents voluntarily organize into institutions that share organizational costs and delegate decisions to representatives. Delegation can reduce individual costs, but it also transfers control to representatives whose private objectives need not align with those of their constituents. We study this tension in a repeated game with endogenous delegation to self-interested centers. A simple reduced-form model yields a scale--accountability tradeoff: larger constituencies offer greater cost-sharing benefits to members, yet the marginal value to a center of retaining any one constituent decreases as group size grows. Consequently, the prospect of individual exit can sustain non-exploitative delegation only up to an endogenous accountable constituency size. Additionally, we identify parameter regions in which fully delegated, accountable governance, when feasible, must be polycentric. We investigate these predictions through simulations with large language model (LLM) agents. Across five matched pairs of 30-agent simulations, polycentric structures repeatedly emerge but remain fluid, exhibiting cycles of concentration, exploitation, exit, and re-formation. We further find that models of different capacity exhibit similar willingness to assume leadership but differ substantially in their exercise of authority, with Sol initiating exploitation more frequently than Luna in matched decision states.
| Subjects: | Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2610.21746 [cs.MA] |
| (or arXiv:2610.21746v1 [cs.MA] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.21746 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Panayiotis Danassis [view email]
[v1]
Thu, 15 Oct 2026 12:04:16 UTC (342 KB)
来源：arXiv cs.MA · arxiv.org