arXiv cs.AI· J. Mark Bishop, Slawomir J. Nasuto·· 12 小时前AI 评分18
从地图到代谢：计算主义的历史先例与统一批判
From Maps to Metabolism: Historical Precedents and a Unified Critique of Computationalism
AI 导读
论文综合Korzybski、Searle、Floridi等人的论述，提出一种非计算的物理主义：意识依赖内在组织、以代谢为基础的物理动力学，而非抽象计算，但不排除人工意识的可能性。作者指出，即便Milkowski、Piccinini等提出的机制计算主义将计算视为物理实现机制的性质，仍无法消解"抽象谬误"——计算归因始终依赖状态个体化、系统边界与解释映射的选择，不由物理事实单独决定。
正文 · 原文
Abstract:Alexander Lerchner's recent work on the 'abstraction fallacy' argues that computational functionalism confuses physical processes with abstract descriptions, and that symbolic computation alone cannot instantiate consciousness. Yet these claims were anticipated by Korzybski's map-territory distinction, Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence, Floridi's levels of abstraction, Spencer et al.'s observer-relativity arguments, Winograd and Flores's account of computation as socially grounded practice, and Nasuto and Bishop's biological arguments. Synthesizing these contributions, this paper advances a form of non-computational physicalism: consciousness depends upon intrinsically organized, metabolically grounded physical dynamics rather than abstract computation, whilst leaving open the possibility of artificial consciousness.
An objection is that this critique targets an outdated computationalism. Mechanistic computationalism, associated with Milkowski, Piccinini, Craver, Bechtel, and Kaplan, treats computation as a property of physically realized mechanisms rather than substrate-independent formalism. Although this represents an important advance, it does not dissolve the abstraction fallacy. Computational attributions remain dependent upon choices of state individuation, system boundaries, and interpretive mapping that are not determined by physical facts alone. Kaplan and Craver's 'model-to-mechanism mapping' constrains computational descriptions without eliminating their dependence upon an external observer. Grounding computation in neural mechanisms does not confer intrinsic significance or the normativity explored by Bickhard and Nasuto and Bishop. The abstraction fallacy persists wherever computational descriptions are treated as constitutive of, rather than descriptive of, physical reality.
| Subjects: | Neurons and Cognition (q-bio.NC); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) |
| ACM classes: | I.2 |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2611.06936 [q-bio.NC] |
| (or arXiv:2611.06936v1 [q-bio.NC] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.06936 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite |
Submission history
From: John Bishop Prof [view email]
[v1]
Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:49:29 UTC (45 KB)
来源：arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org