arXiv cs.AI· Eduardo Perez-Richet, Vasiliki Skreta·· 3 天前AI 评分12
如何设计防伪造的非市场资源分配机制
Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
AI 导读
研究刻画了在多种伪造技术下防伪造的最优资源分配规则，并给出一个诚实条件——满足该条件时，这些规则可解决规划者最大化配置剩余与智能体福利加权和的无约束问题。研究指出，朴素最优规则会导致伪造与配置低效，而兼顾伪造的配置效率优化通常会诱发伪造，给智能体带来高昂成本，并产生负外部性。
正文 · 原文
Abstract:Relying on manipulable characteristics to target the allocation of resources is fraught with difficulties. Naively optimal rules lead to falsification and allocative inefficiency. Optimizing the rule for allocative efficiency while accounting for falsification typically induces falsification, at a heavy cost to the agents. Moreover, falsification generates negative externalities. We characterize optimal falsification-proof rules under a broad range of falsification technologies. We also provide an honesty condition under which they solve the unconstrained problem of a planner who maximizes a weighted sum of allocative surplus and agents' welfare.
| Subjects: | Theoretical Economics (econ.TH); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2610.18625 [econ.TH] |
| (or arXiv:2610.18625v1 [econ.TH] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.18625 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Vasiliki Skreta [view email]
[v1]
Tue, 13 Oct 2026 16:03:20 UTC (214 KB)
来源：arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org