arXiv cs.MA· Masahiko Ueda·· 11 小时前AI 评分18
随机博弈中的反馈型专制策略
Feedback autocratic strategies in stochastic games
AI 导读
研究者将重复博弈中单方面控制收益的策略推广为随机博弈中的反馈策略，并给出这类策略在特定假设下充当收益控制器的充要条件。论文在多个社会困境相关示例中展示了该反馈策略的表现，从而把重复博弈的收益控制理论与随机博弈的反馈控制理论联系起来。
正文 · 原文
Abstract:A stochastic game is an optimal control problem for multiple agents in a stochastic environment. Stochastic games contain important practical problems, related to environmental issues or traffic flows. If the number of environmental states is one, such stochastic games are called repeated games. In repeated games, several strategies which unilaterally control payoffs have been proposed, and these strategies work in a mechanism similar to feedback control. In this paper, we generalize these strategies as feedback strategies in stochastic games, and investigate their properties. In particular, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for such feedback strategies to work as controllers of payoffs under some assumptions. We demonstrate the performance of such feedback strategies in several examples related to social dilemmas. Our findings connect the theory of payoff control in repeated games to the theory of feedback control in stochastic games.
| Comments: | 19 pages, 2 figures |
| Subjects: | Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Systems and Control (eess.SY) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2610.36683 [physics.soc-ph] |
| (or arXiv:2610.36683v1 [physics.soc-ph] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.36683 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Masahiko Ueda [view email]
[v1]
Tue, 27 Oct 2026 05:52:44 UTC (79 KB)
来源：arXiv cs.MA · arxiv.org