Linear COO Cristina Cordova 谈如何把 GTM 做到 $100M ARR
Linear COO Cristina Cordova 在 Latent Space 播客中披露,公司今年 ARR 突破 $100M,拥有超 40,000 名付费客户和 177% 净收入留存率,8 月员工以 $2.5B 估值出售了 $99M 股票。
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Latent Space· Basil Chatha·2026-11-20 07:58· 1 小时前AI 评分66
将 Linear 的 GTM 扩展到 1 亿美元 ARR — Cristina Cordova,COO
AI 导读
Latent Space 播客访谈 Linear COO Cristina Cordova,谈公司如何在 CEO 发文《Issue tracking is dead》后转向围绕 agent 编排的产品开发系统。
正文 · 原文
Linear 创立之初是为了打造更好的 issue tracker。七年后、融资 1.34 亿美元,其 CEO Karri Saarinen 发表了一篇题为 “Issue tracking is dead.” 的文章。在本期节目中,我们与 Cristina Cordova 交谈,她是 Linear 的 COO,聊公司如何应对这一转变,以及其 go-to-market 策略一路上的变化。
Cristina 在 Stripe 工作了七年半,在 Notion 领导平台与合作伙伴关系,在 2023 年加入 Linear 之前是 First Round 的合伙人。Linear 的创始人在 Coinbase、Airbnb 和 Uber 使用遗留 issue tracker 之后打造了它,并通过 Vercel 和 Ramp 等初创公司以自助方式传播开来。
她加入时,Linear 约有 40 人,只有一名销售人员。此后,它推出了 MCP server、用于在 Linear 中构建 agent 的平台、与 Codex、Cursor 和 GitHub Copilot 的集成,以及自己的 Linear Agent。一年前,agent 创建了 Linear 上 3% 的工作。现在这一比例超过一半。Linear 今年 ARR 突破 1 亿美元,拥有超过 40,000 名付费客户和 177% 的净收入留存率,8 月员工以 25 亿美元估值出售了 9900 万美元股票。
我们聊了她为什么在加入三周后就停止追逐企业大单,为什么 Linear 从未招聘过一名 SDR,为什么它不会让 LLM 独自回答支持工单,以及支撑数月内 1 亿美元 ARR 的 AI 预算对其他人意味着什么。
Linear 上一半的工作现在由 agent 创建
Linear 于 2025 年 5 月推出其 MCP server,Cristina 说这基本上是同类中的第一个。一年半后,Linear 中创建的超过一半 issue 来自 agent。
这并不意味着 Linear 想成为一个上面架着 MCP server 的数据库。Cristina 认为,满足于此的 SaaS 公司正在犯一个大错。如果你产品内部的 agent 工作流不比外部的更好,就没有人有理由打开你的应用。
所以她关注两条线:agent 使用量和应用使用量。如果 agent 使用量攀升而应用使用量没有,你就在变成商品。在 Linear,两者都在上升,因为人们仍然会回到应用来查看和协调工作。
“Issue tracking is dead”
当 Karri 在 3 月发表 “Issue tracking is dead” 时,Linear 的大多数客户都同意他的观点。然后他们问了那个显而易见的问题:那我买的是什么?Linear 的答案是围绕 agent 编排构建的产品开发系统,人类不再做提交、标记、分配和关闭 issue 的体力活。
客户一直在推动它朝这个方向发展。大多数前沿 AI 实验室都运行在 Linear 上,并希望它走得更快。Ramp 和 Coinbase 等前 AI 时代的公司正在构建自己的内部 agent,需要一个 API 将它们接入 Linear。
Cristina 说 Linear 很幸运,它小到可以自我蚕食。Google 面临的问题要难得多:在每个搜索结果上方放一个 AI 答案,看广告的人就更少了。
跳转到 “issue tracking is dead” 讨论 →
几个月内投入1亿美元的AI预算
Cristina说,眼下加速采购的是AI预算。公司为以前不存在的AI工具专门划出了资金,任何能装进这笔预算的产品都跳过了通常的争取开支之战。在一些公司,这笔预算非常高。
这种情况已经开始改变。买家签的是一年期合同和付费试点,而不是三年期合同,因为没人知道两年后自己会需要什么。而一些“一夜之间1亿美元”的故事,其实是与国防公司或大型律所签下的几份3000万到4000万美元的合同。这与Linear的4万名付费客户是完全不同的生意——直到6月,Linear还完全采用按席位定价。
当这些一年期合同到期续约时,我们就会知道谁的ARR是真的。
Linear抛弃了其2025年企业路线图
2023年加入三周后,Cristina就把“向上进军企业市场”从Linear的公司目标中划掉了。当时公司只有一名销售人员。她转而瞄准那些必须替换掉现有工具的增长期公司,就像Stripe在赢得转换用户之前很久就先赢得了新企业一样。
Linear终于在2025年宣布进军企业市场,路线图里满是面向大型组织的功能。然后agent时代来了。Linear构建了MCP服务器、一套拥有全新API的agent平台,以及与Codex、Cursor和GitHub Copilot的集成。这些都不在计划之中,很多企业级工作也从未完成。
Cristina还是选择抢先冲刺。竞争对手在观望,而企业开始把Linear列入候选名单。
没有SDR,没有前置部署工程师
Linear从未招聘过一名SDR。Cristina认为资格审核电话浪费客户时间:他们想要演示,而不是被问预算问题。AE自己做外呼,并借助工具保持个性化。
Linear也不做前置部署工程。Linear应该足够容易采用,以至于没人需要访问你的系统。相反,解决方案工程师与企业AE一起销售,有时会连夜构建一个可用的ServiceNow集成,向潜在客户证明这可以做到。Cristina补充说,一个有明确主张的工具能给agent提供更干净的数据,而如果一个工具里每个团队对“bug”的定义都不同,就做不到这一点。
支持团队保持内部化,Linear不会让LLM独自回答工单。AI起草回复,由人决定发出什么。客户有时会以为回复是AI写的,因为它们来得太快。三年半以来,Cristina从未因糟糕的支持体验而遭遇升级投诉。
人人都想要基于结果的定价
Cristina很喜欢Intercom的Fin那种模式,即按其AI解决的每次支持对话收费。对Linear来说这更难。当一家公司认为自动把bug分派给正确团队是PM的职责,而另一家公司不这么认为时,这值多少钱?
在有人破解这个问题之前,Linear对给自己带来成本的部分收费,其余保持免费。席位费保留。Linear Agent聊天是免费的,尽管它运行在前沿模型上。在编码会话中,用户选择OpenAI或Anthropic的模型和harness,Linear按公布的API价格加小幅加价转售。Loops则消耗AI credits。
Linear 不会对过去免费的功能开始收费。新的 AI 功能以免费测试版形式推出,并会提示即将收费,而且价格是先高后低,而不是反过来。
为什么不招 100 名销售人员?
Cristina 说,Linear 的员工人数大约只有同阶段、同营收公司的一半。一个比公司其他部门都大的销售团队,会让工程团队如今对销售团队的信任付之东流。
她从 Stripe 带来了一条 40% 规则:公司至少 40% 的人应该是工程、产品、设计和数据人员。如果销售想要更多人,它会先帮忙招工程师。Linear 没有硬性规定,但她最先做的事情之一就是按职能做了一张人员编制表,而且她至今仍在关注这个比例。
招聘是刻意放慢的。候选人要在一个真实问题上进行工作试用。她的题目是撰写 Linear 未来六到十二个月的市场推广计划,后来这成了她的工作。公司大约 170 人,唯一的 C 级高管就是几位创始人和她。
节目笔记
Linear —— Cristina 担任 COO 的产品开发系统。
与打造 Linear 的人分享其增长 —— 8 月以 25 亿美元估值进行的要约收购,付费客户超过 40,000 家,净收入留存率为 177%。
问题跟踪已死 —— Karri 三月份的文章,解释 Linear 为何要为智能体而构建。
Linear MCP 服务器 —— Cristina 称 2025 年 5 月的发布基本是该类别的首创。
推出 Linear Agent —— 内置智能体,Linear 对其聊天功能保持免费。
我们如何构建 Triage Intelligence —— 该功能会为传入问题建议标签并捕捉重复项,是 Cristina 举的无需成为智能体的 AI 例子
Linear 中的编码会话 —— 6 月发布,终结了 Linear 的全席位定价,在 AI 额度上运行 Claude Code 和 Codex。
推出 Loops —— 循环执行的智能体任务,同样按 AI 额度计费。
Intercom Fin 定价 —— 每次已解决对话 0.99 美元,这是 Cristina 希望适用于 Linear 的按结果计费模式。
时间戳
0:00 开场
0:51 认识 Linear 的 COO Cristina Cordova
1:39 Linear 为何在 40 人时聘请 COO
5:01 她的工作试用:为 Linear 制定市场推广计划
12:11 将企业级从公司目标中划掉
20:00 为什么仅作为 MCP 服务器背后的数据库还不够
23:39 在“问题跟踪已死”之后如何销售
34:40 更小、更扁平的团队,没有 SDR
36:14 AI 起草支持回复,人类负责把关
42:23 Linear 为何不做前置部署工程
47:53 为什么一些 AI 初创公司能如此迅速地达到 1 亿美元 ARR
50:06 从按席位定价转向按使用量定价
57:07 用 2025 年企业级路线图换取智能体
1:03:28 Linear 现在的护城河是什么
1:05:54 为什么不招 100 名销售人员?
1:08:59 Stripe 的工程人员占比 40% 规则
文字记录
自动转录自修订版;姓名和措辞可能有误。
0:00 Karri 写这篇博客文章,说问题跟踪已死。那么你怎么向客户解释,嘿,你知道,我们整个业务以前就是问题跟踪,现在我们的 CEO 刚写了这篇博客文章?我们业务的好处在于,我们没那么大,不会把自己搞死。对吧?是啊。如果你像 Google 那样,要干掉搜索业务,可能真的很难。对吧?然后在每个搜索结果顶部放一个 AI 框,也许没人会看广告了。对吧?所以你的整个业务被颠覆了。而且,是的,问题的单元仍然存在,但我们大概不应该有一个人们手动跟踪工作的世界。对。所以,这就是已死的东西。对吧?所以很多情况下,当这篇博客文章出来时,我们和各个客户交谈,我们大多数客户都说,是啊。跟踪已死。顺便问一下,你们是什么?我在买什么?对吧?Cristina Cordova,你是 Linear 的 COO。你能介绍一下自己吗?是啊。是啊。我是 Cristina。我在 Linear 大约三年半了。作为 COO 加入,今天仍然是 COO。在 Linear 之前,我在 Notion 待过,领导我们的平台,也就是构建我们的 API,然后是我们的合作伙伴关系和自助增长计划。在那之前,我在 Stripe 待了七年半。在那里,我领导了很多早期的合作伙伴关系和市场推广,然后转到产品侧,为早期公司构建了一些新产品。所以我大概从公司的产品侧和管理工程师,一直到管理公司的业务侧,这真的很有趣。
1:30 那么,Linear 为什么在只有 40 名员工左右的时候就聘请了一位 COO?这算奇怪,还是相当正常?我的意思是,我通常并不认为每家公司都需要一位 COO。是的。对吧?比如,当我和创始人交流,他们说,嘿,我觉得我们找到了产品市场契合点,我们该如何开始扩展公司的业务侧?我常常会觉得自己在劝阻他们聘请像我这样的人。所以我认为每家公司的情况都略有不同。我认为作为创始人,你必须真正理解你需要什么、你在寻找什么,以及你要引入团队的人。通常早期只是像,我需要有人来卖东西。对吧?我们已经超出了创始人 CEO 亲自销售每一个净新增客户的能力范围。所以在那时,我通常会说,你应该招销售方面的人。也许招一位销售负责人来组建团队。对吧?但如果你并不确切知道自己要在营销或运营或公司其他部分寻找什么,那么聘请像我这样的人很可能就不合理。你知道,我认为对于 Linear 的创始人来说,他们非常专注于设计和工程以及产品。我认为他们三人之间有着非常好的技能组合。但当我们开始扩展公司的业务侧时,他们并不一定看着我们招的下一个销售人员说,我确切知道我们在这里要找什么,我知道销售是否表现得很好。对吧?所以如果你不审视公司的不同部分并说,好,我知道什么是卓越,而且我觉得我很清楚如何达到卓越,那么有时候聘请像我这样的人,或者一位职能负责人,在需要的时候,可能会有帮助。
3:00 是的。那么,当时业务是什么样子?比如,你能谈谈他们当时的收入是多少吗?或者 是的。我们大概……我想说,你知道,我们有一些大客户,但没有上市公司客户。大概没有客户超过,我想说,也许 500 个席位之类的。所以我会说,我们大多止步于中端市场。我们可能最出名的是作为一款适合初创公司的好产品,但不一定适合其他公司 是的。在当时。你知道,我认为在那个时候,我们在产品驱动增长模式上做得很好,大多数人使用我们的产品是因为他们自助注册。嗯。然后随着时间与我们共同成长。所以像 Vercel 和 Ramp 以及许多其他这样的客户,你知道,真的从未与 Linear 的人交谈过。注册了产品,开始使用,然后开始扩展,这很棒。就像,你知道,产品本身可以完成很多工作。但这也开始……就像,是时候开始向那些甚至不签合同就不会往你的服务里放一丁点数据的公司销售了 是的。
4:30 然后做试点,并调研他们的团队,了解他们之前用什么工具,以及……你知道,这是什么工具,哪个更好。对吧?所以这对公司来说是一种非常不同的动作,开始向更大的公司扩展。而这差不多就是我的目标。自从我加入以来,我们至少增长了 10 倍,我想。所以……你加入大概是四年前?三……差不多三年半前。是的。哦,好的。所以我觉得 Linear 的创始人们谈过这个。我觉得你也谈过,就是,在你加入 Linear 之前,你总是会有一个试用期?是的。那你是不是也必须经历一个试用期?我经历了。好的。是的。是的。所以,那是什么样的?是的。我是说,我觉得我的项目挺简单的。大概是,你知道,为 Linear 制定一个上市计划,你知道,有一个限定的时间段,比如接下来六到十二个月之类的。对吧?我觉得这样做的好处是,你知道,那就是这份工作。就像……对吧?所以你不是给某人一个虚构的项目,那个项目并不真正代表他们加入公司后会做什么。它像一个真实的项目。而那实际上就是我加入公司后的工作。所以是的。你知道,如果他们不喜欢我在那个项目中产出的结果,他们大概就不应该雇我。是的。所以我觉得这是一个很好的方式,可以说,我有一些关于公司可以做得更好的想法,但我也想从一线的人那里获得反馈。就像,你知道,我们团队里有一个销售人员。有人做客户成功。有人做支持,还有一两个人做市场。对吧?所以从他们那里获得关于业务不同部分的视角,以及我应该关注哪里、在哪里排优先级。
6:00 然后确保公司也认同那个愿景,我觉得这对我非常有帮助。然后当我真正开始在公司工作时,几乎就像我有了这个小蓝图,是的。关于我的工作应该是什么,我应该完成什么。你能谈谈那个计划里有什么吗?我觉得很多是品牌和营销导向的。所以比如,你知道,围绕让 Linear 在很多方面变得不可避免的事情。所以,你知道,要么你已经在用 Linear,要么你就应该有效地规划迁移到 Linear。而我们想要获取的大多数公司都应该,你知道,处于其中一个世界。所以很多是围绕,你知道,推动品牌、构建故事讲述,我觉得提升公司的知名度,因为我觉得我们很有名,但我会说是在特定细分领域,而不是真正在之外。是的。好的。所以就像,你知道,我们在做营销,但我们唯一在做的营销就是发邮件,如果我们有某个新发布内容的变更日志。而结果发现,不到 10% 的用户订阅了邮件。所以大多数人甚至不一定知道我们正在发布的新功能,这很有趣。然后我们会发一条推文。
7:30 好的。比如,是从创始人的账号发,还是从公司账号发?然后,你知道,创始人会转发,而且他们自己也有相当强的社交媒体影响力。但你知道,那基本上就是全部了,真的。是的。所以,你知道,很多时候就是在想,好吧,我们怎样才能以更好的方式讲述一个更完整的故事?然后我们怎样才能真正触达我们想触达的人?结果发现,其实我们的很多用户每天都在应用里。是的。那么,为什么我们不直接给他们发通知,告诉他们产品里有什么变化,就在他们每天已经在的地方。对吧?所以,你知道,就是思考一些可能成为营销现有用户或营销全新客户的好方法,同时又不会让人觉得与品牌格格不入。对吧?是的。所以我花了很多时间在这上面。很多时间也花在壮大销售团队上。你知道,我觉得很多早期公司,尤其是工程驱动、产品主导增长型的公司,都会觉得,你知道,产品应该能自我销售。然后大家都会意识到,嗯,那只能带你走到某个程度。是的。然后当你想增长得更快时,对吧,你也需要开始思考用不同的方式触达人们。而且不是每个人都自助购买产品。尤其是当你在选择一个对产品开发流程如此核心的系统时,我们就是这样的。是的。很多公司不会在没有与人建立信任的情况下做出那个决定。而且,你知道,当我做工作试用时,我们销售团队只有一个人。对吧?那还不是你。所以就像,你知道,只有一个人,你能做的也有限。
9:00 对吧?他算是个有经验的销售吗?是的。是的。是的。是的。是的。他实际上是我们今天的销售负责人。好的。酷。所以他领导我们整个销售团队。所以他很棒。但是,你知道,当时我会说这并不真正是他的问题。更多是公司的问题。就像,我们到底想怎么发展这个团队?对吧?你可以用很多方式发展销售团队。你可以有很多 SDR。嗯。我们没有 SDR。你现在可以有前置部署工程师。这非常流行。对吧?我们实际上不做前置部署工程。我们有解决方案工程师,我认为这是有区别的、有些不同的。但我们是后来才加的。我们真的……那属于销售组织吗?是的。酷。我们一开始真的优化了团队,招聘有经验的 AE,比如卖过技术产品的。因为我们知道,如果你以前卖给过设计师,如果你以前卖给过工程师,我们就不一定需要教你怎么做。而且我认为,卖给一个非常挑剔、不想看你的花哨幻灯片、只想直接看演示的人,是的。你知道,这和卖给一个,我不知道,人力运营或者别的什么人非常不同。所以,寻找有那种非常明确经验的人,然后确保我们能让他们入职、培训他们,让他们在产品本身上真正胜任。是的。因为这对与客户建立信任是必需的。对吧?所以就是弄清楚,这家公司有什么不同,招聘或扩张会有什么不同,你知道。还有,创始人想用什么方式做,我们能不能做到?所以支持是个有趣的例子。我面试的时候,创始人非常明确,他们不想外包支持。而我从未在一家不外包支持的公司工作过。所以那就像……
10:30 是的。我以为 Stripe 是内部做的。对吧?不。他们外包。哦,好的。是的。有意思。除非我在那里之后有什么变化。但是,你知道,他们也有内部人员做支持。是的。但他们确实外包。所以,你知道,我认为对我们来说,那是我们真正想保持的东西,因为我们真的很在乎提供高质量的体验、快速的体验,并且知道在很长一段时间里,我们没有销售团队。对吧?是的。所以因为没有销售团队,我们知道你的第一个接触点,通常,如果你想和人交谈,会是支持。所以支持最好要好。是的。对吧?所以我们现在仍然能够弄清楚如何把团队扩展到今天这样一个完全外包的全球团队。所以,你知道,我们会看看未来会怎样。是的。你知道,对任何这些事情永远别说永远。但是你知道,有些我们想做事的方式,我们可能想尽可能长时间地这样做,只要这对业务可行并且合理。
12:00 是的。所以当你刚加入时,我想我从未担任过销售职位,但比如你是否必须说,好吧,我们从初创公司开始,我们不能直接去找大企业并向他们销售?我们必须一步一步来。那么,你是否必须说,哦,我们必须先拿下中型企业,然后在某个时候再进军大企业?这到底是怎么运作的?是的。是的。所以当我加入 Linear 时,我想我们大概有三个目标,三个公司层面的目标。其中一个就是向高端市场进军,瞄准大企业。然后在我加入三周后,我们有一次公司团建。我站在全公司面前,当时大概有 35、40 人吧。我展示了那三个目标的幻灯片,然后把那个写着我们要进军大企业的目标划掉了。因为我当时想,我们只有一个人。我们销售团队真的只有一个人。你知道,你不可能靠一个人进军大企业市场。是的。所以你必须思考,你能做什么?你需要学习什么才能达到那个目标?然后你实际上是否有资源去实现那个目标?对吧?而且,你知道,我认为在那个时期我们这些条件一个都不具备。是的。对吧?我们赢下的一些公司主要是因为它们已经成长为增长阶段的公司或实际上属于中型企业。但在那个时候,我们并没有大量获取净新的中型企业客户。所以我把那个目标改成了,不,我们要瞄准增长阶段的公司。这将是我们的目标。如果我们能赢下大量处于增长阶段的公司,它们已经有某种工具在某种程度上做着和我们类似的事情,而我们……我们必须进去说服它们,把那个工具拆掉换成 Linear,那么如果我们能做到这一点,这就能给我信心说,你知道,在一年或两年内,我们就能进军大企业市场。
13:30 但现在我对此没有信心,那我为什么要把这个设为团队的目标呢?完全同意。关键就在于设定这些小步目标,确保你在服务今天能服务好的公司时做得非常出色。这样当这些公司,你知道,当大公司打来推荐电话问,嘿,你喜欢 Linear 吗,你的体验好吗?它们会说非常正面的话。这有助于我们拿下净新客户。我在 Stripe 时情况非常类似。我们很长一段时间并没有赢下很多从竞争对手那里转换过来的净新公司。我们做得很好的是赢下每一个新创立的业务。比如一家初创公司第一次接入支付。然后我们才开始赢下那些转换过来的公司。有些事情就是需要时间。这非常……销售一个需要拆掉现有技术并替换的产品,和销售一个在现有系统之上漂亮闪亮的新东西,是非常不同的。
15:00 是的。所以知道我在这个职位上处于非常相似的位置,重要的是,我只是让团队围绕我认为可解决的问题来定位。然后只在2025年……所以那是2023年。直到2025年,我才,你知道,站在公司面前说,我们今年要进军企业市场。对吧?哦,哇。那时我们开始了企业销售部门并组建了那个团队。是的。所以……好吧。你们是在做中型企业。所以你基本上让所有人……因为大多数……大多数公司都有问题跟踪器。对吧?是的。或者某种……所以你必须试着把他们从那些工具上撬走。所以是的。比如你怎么说服他们说,哦是的,我们在用xyz产品。它对我们有效。但是,是的,比如,你知道,基本上说服我。是的。以及我为什么要切换?早期,关键是比替代方案明显更好。对吧?我不认为你能好20%、好30%就让人们切换,因为存在切换成本。对吧?所以我认为你必须弄清楚如何阐述你的产品比已经在相当好地服务市场的东西更好。相当好到……他们有很多公司在用他们的产品。对吧?但我们进入的这个领域的好处是,我认为Linear创始人选择这个领域的原因之一是他们都是那些传统工具的用户。是的。对吧,当他们在Coinbase、Airbnb和Uber工作时。所以他们知道,没人喜欢这些工具。
16:30 是的。对吧?当这些工具在他们公司推广时,他们就说,哦不,你知道的,那种快乐时光要结束了。我们得开始用这些工具了。对吧?所以,在很多方面,他们已有的这种认知和意识真的很有帮助,比如对我们这个领域竞争对手所带来的那种感受。是的。而且能想出如何打造一款让人们真正兴奋的产品,来管理他们的工作。对吧?这大概不是你预期的事情。所以我们早期构建时的大量重点都放在设计和用户体验上。对吧?是的。让它成为一款人们每天都想用、也必须用的产品。难就难在,人们得先试用才能理解它。对吧?是的。而不是像看销售演示里的几页幻灯片就说,好吧,我懂了。对吧?所以我认为我们在战略上做得很好的一件事,就是让产品任何人都能开始使用。所以,你知道,最初是免费产品,一旦你在使用量上达到某些限制,就得开始付费。所以很多开始在公司里使用 Linear 的人,其实只是免费地为自己玩玩,然后感受到了它有多好用,以及相比竞争对手,使用这款产品会容易多少。所以我们就是从这里起步的。我认为这在有一段时间里效果很好。现在我们销售 Linear 的方式已经非常不同了。我们通常会跟公司谈论过去一年半到两年里这个领域发生的巨变,比如,你知道,你整个产品开发流程都被颠覆了。嗯。你构建产品的方式已经完全改变了。
18:00 再生活在这样的世界里已经不合理了……比如,你有一种手动的方式,就像,哦,我发现了一个 bug。哦,我要把这个 bug 报告到我的问题跟踪器里。是的。哦,我要给它打标签并分配给另一个人。然后那个人会修复它,你知道,添加状态更新,然后关闭它,再通知客户。这条路径上的每一步都完全是手动的。那只是……对于我们如今所处的世界来说,这完全说不通。你跟大多数公司谈,他们都会说,是的。我完全同意。所以过去一年半里,我们真正把公司围绕智能体来定位,让智能体执行工作流中大量实际上不属于产品开发的部分。就像我在那整条链里描述的一切,那都不是你在构建产品。所以如果你能让 Linear 成为智能体工作流的绝佳工具,那么使用 Linear 的单个工程师、单个 PM 或设计师,最终就能把更多时间花在构建产品上,而更少花在手动在系统里搬动工作、以证明自己在为公司增加价值上。
19:30 是的。这真的很有意思,因为早期的卖点似乎是用户体验,对吧?而现在看来,人类似乎不再需要与 UI 交互了。我其实觉得现在很多公司都觉得,只要做一个数据库就行了。嗯。然后有一个 MCP 服务器,把自己的数据都开放出去,是的。给智能体,让智能体与它们互操作,并认为这会是一个很棒的商业模式。但我认为这最终不会是一个很棒的商业模式。是的。我认为你必须把智能体工作流引入你自己的工具中,并让它们比人们会在外部使用的、用来与你的系统互操作的工具更好。否则,人们就没有理由进入你的工具。对吧?所以对我们来说,我们通常关注的指标——而且我们在这方面看到了很大的变化——你知道,我们在 2025 年推出了 MCP 服务器。我想我们基本上是所在领域第一家这么做的公司。而现在,仅仅一年半的时间里,Linear 上创建的 issue 中超过 50% 是由智能体创建的。
21:00 是的。工作的创建方式与以前完全不同了。你知道吗?这在一定程度上说明了在相当短的时间内发生了多大的变化。然后当我们看有多少用户来到应用并在应用内集成或创建 issue 时,这个数字也显著上升。好的。对吧?所以有时人们会认为,哦,我现在所有事情都只用 MCP 服务器了。但你也会回到应用里与它交互,因为你需要将事物可视化。而且通常,聊天界面并不是可视化团队所有工作的最佳方式。它也不太适合协作,因为它通常只是单人模式。嗯。所以我认为对我们来说,只要 MCP 使用曲线和应用使用曲线一起向右上方增长,这就证明了我们既有对人类友好的出色 UX,也对智能体友好。对吧?我认为这就是我们作为产品的目标:在这两方面都做到出色。而且,这并不意味着现在有了智能体,你就不必关心界面了。嗯。应用使用量就是按使用人数来衡量的吗?因为我猜你们的客户群也在增长。对吧?那么你如何……工作创建
22:30 在应用中。所以,你知道,我们的工作单元,最小的工作单元就是 issue。对吧?所以如果你只看创建的工作,那就像是人进入应用,比如我们的移动应用、桌面应用、网页应用,所有这些地方,然后创建工作。对吧?如果你看工作如何在流水线中移动,比如分配给一个 agent,有时这是由人手动完成的。你知道,有时是 agent 来做。嗯。但是分配……比如委托给另一个 agent。对吧?是的。现在,我们经常是工作流的一部分。对吧?你可以使用我们称为 loops 的功能,它会自动将 agent 分配给给定的 issue,并让 agent 开始针对它编码,所以在很多情况下,是 agent 在做工作,但它是 Linear agent。是的。对吧?这也是我们想看到的。对吧?所以我们必须考虑多个不同的因素。但一般来说,我们关注的是应用会话,以理解活动。是的。所以我想这引出了 Karri 写的那篇博客文章,说 issue tracking 已死。是的。所以我猜他写那篇文章时,你正在签一些合同。那么你如何向客户解释,嘿,我们整个业务以前是 issue tracking,现在我们的 CEO 刚写了这篇博客文章。是的。是的。比如你如何向他们解释,以及这个转变是如何发生的?
24:00 是的。嗯,我认为我们业务的好处在于,我们没有大到会杀死自己。对吧?是的。比如,如果你是 Google,要杀死搜索业务可能真的很难。是的。对吧?然后在每个搜索结果顶部放一个 AI 框,也许没人会看广告了。对吧?所以你的整个业务被颠覆了。所以,你知道,我认为这就是许多 AI 之前的工具所面临的创新者困境挑战的一部分,我们当然是那些 AI 之前的公司之一。是的。所以对我们来说,好处是,好吧。你知道,我们看到世界正朝着这个方向发展,你可以选择拥抱它,计划为新时代打造最好的产品,嗯,而不是试图抓住一个可能几年后就不存在的时代。对吧?所以,你知道,如果我谈到的那个工作流,比如在流程的每一步都需要人工手动干预,那不会是我们所处的世界。比如,你现在看 Linear,是的,issue 这个单元仍然存在。但我们可能不应该有一个人们手动跟踪工作的世界。是的。所以,这就是已死的东西。对吧?所以在很多情况下,当这篇博客文章出来时,我们与各种客户交谈,大多数客户都说,是的。跟踪已死。顺便问一下,你们是什么?我买的是什么?对吧?
25:30 所以它现在更多地围绕着一个产品开发系统来定位。对吧?我们希望你们专注于打造更好的产品,而我们将构建一个系统,让你们能够以极少的手工工作来实现这一点。所以这也关乎于,比如说,我们要创建一个新品类。而且,是的,我们在很多方面仍然会在旧品类中参与竞争,但我们作为一个团队,也在把绝大部分资源投入到这个新品类中,比如智能体编排、以一种你不必做大量手工工作的方式来管理工作,你知道的,不必把任务手动地通过一个系统来推进,而是以更加智能体化的方式运作,无论是在 Linear 内部还是外部。所以我想,那种转变,或者说那篇博客文章,你是否感到措手不及?比如 Karri 写的,或者他……不,不。我们所有人都是一致的。那么,你是否看到,你的客户在要求这一点?还是说,是你想推动你的客户朝那个方向走?我认为我们的一些客户在要求这一点,我的意思是,Linear 被绝大多数前沿 AI 实验室所使用,举个例子。你知道的,绝大多数顶尖 AI 公司已经在使用 Linear 了。所以如果你看看那个客户群体,你知道的,这种全新的、在 Linear 之后起步的一代公司。嗯。其中许多公司都在说,你知道的,这就是我们前进的方向。对吧?我们希望 Linear 朝着那个方向前进。否则,它对我们来说就不是合适的产品。对吧?然后与此同时,我们也看到了一些在 AI 之前就存在的公司。这方面的例子可能是像 Ramp 或 Coinbase 这样的公司,你知道的,它们在这一切之前就已经存在了。是的。并且决定要投入自己的内部团队来构建内部智能体,与它们一起工作。是的。对吧?所以我们当时就想,嘿,我们实际上需要一个 API,让你们能够在 Linear 内创建智能体。
27:00 所以,如果你是这些公司之一,你知道的,它几乎是在 AI 之前就存在,但仍然处于 AI 的最前沿,并且你正在创建自己的定制智能体,来帮助在内部管理各种不同类型的工作或代码,而且你想拥有与之相关的专有数据,我们就想构建这个 API,让你能够将 Linear 与那些工具深度集成。对吧?而且当时我们的竞争对手中没有任何一家拥有这样的系统或一套 API。所以,再一次,就像率先构建许多这些与 Linear 交互的新方式,你知道的,智能体工作流的格式,然后也把智能体直接构建到 Linear 中。我认为这对我们来说都非常新,有些客户在要求我们提供这些。我得说很多客户并没有要求。但我可以告诉你,现在他们中的很多人都非常高兴。是的。因为我们有了很多这些功能。因为并不是每家公司都处于产品开发方式变革的最前沿。
28:30 我想这就是我想表达的意思,就是,你会不会……我……我猜是因为你当时想更偏向企业级,所以很多都是那种传统型公司。对吧?是的。而且不是那种真正在推动我们朝这个方向走的公司。嗯。但现在反而是这些公司在联系我们,说,嘿,我们做事的很多方式已经变了,我们用来构建产品的系统也应该像编码智能体这个领域一样快速变化。嗯。如果你觉得你的底层工具集并没有真正改变,没有在这个新世界里真正进化,那你可能就该考虑换工具了。对吧?当你开始构建这些新功能时,你怎么教客户使用这些功能?你们是怎么做的?是的。是的。所以……对。第一,我想说,你知道,我们再次强调,像销售和客户成功这样的职能要非常深入地理解产品。我们真的努力让销售和成功团队彼此分享经验。所以,你知道,我们的很多通话都用 Gong 录下来,举个例子。而且,我们的客户经常会,你知道,屏幕共享他们的工作流程给我们看。然后我们就可以把这当作学习,说,你知道,这家公司是这么做的。很有意思。也许我可以把这个带给另一个客户。对吧?所以既有从客户那里学习,这……我是说,当你的客户是构建者时,你应该始终考虑,你要如何向他们学习,而不只是如何教他们。对吧?
30:00 有 AI 实验室作为客户很不错。没错。没错。然后你把这些经验拿过来,说,我该怎么把它打包给一个可能还没到那个阶段的用户?对吧?然后,你知道,举个例子,我们有客户说,哦,对。要是有一个智能体能帮我分诊所有东西,那不是很棒吗?因为,不。没人想整理自己的待办积压。对吧?这任务感觉太落伍了。对吧?所以,你知道,我们构建了一个叫 triage intelligence 的功能,它实际上能让进入你分诊工作流的任何东西,比如缺陷报告、功能请求等等,自动打标签、分配、放到正确团队的队列里。而且,作为人类,你不需要做任何事,这一切就会发生。对吧?所以就像,你不需要为此构建一个智能体。我们可以直接帮你做。对。对吧?所以不是所有东西都必须是智能体。它可以只是产品的一部分。对吧?所以这既教会了我们,你知道,当然是如何教下一个客户更好地做事。但也帮助我们把这一点融入到产品本身。
31:30 是的。然后对我们团队的人来说,销售起来就轻松多了。那么,如果……比如,你怎么教销售人员使用工程工具呢?哦,Linear 最棒的一点就是,任何人都能用它。比如,我想到 GitHub issues 之类的,当我进入 GitHub 时,我会想,哦。是的。作为一个不是工程师的人,我会想,哦,我会搞砸的。我不属于这里。对吧?但我觉得我们所做的事情最棒的一点就是,事实并非如此。我们努力打造一个极其易用、设计精良的产品,不仅面向工程师,而是真正面向所有人。嗯。对吧?所以现在越来越多地,我们在组织内部全面推广。所以,销售、运营等团队,以及任何想了解产品路线图或想对产品路线图提出意见的人,都在使用我们的产品。而且这对他们来说也非常易用。对吧?所以我觉得这让事情容易多了,因为它……它并不可怕。是的。作为一个系统或工具。而我们的销售人员,你知道,已经学会了这一点。这……在公司里,如你所想,我们在 Linear 中做了很多事情。所以是的。仅仅是为了在公司正常工作,你就需要知道如何使用它。然后,很大程度上还在于对员工进行良好的培训。我认为我们在赋能方面投入了很多。你实际上必须完成各种课程,才能获得认证去销售 Linear。是的。并且能独自与客户通话。所以我们确实要求我们的销售代表对产品有深入了解。而且,也许最复杂的工程工作流可能是我们的代码审查产品或我们的 GitHub 集成。这些有时会有些复杂,因为你需要设置 GitHub,还要有一个演示用的 GitHub 工作区,以及是的。一个演示用的 Linear 工作区,以确保它们能协同工作。那可能会稍微复杂一些。
33:00 但是,你知道,大部分都依赖于另一个工具以及与之集成的工作流。但我觉得最棒的是,现在我们团队有销售人员提交网站文案修改。我团队有市场人员在做决定,比如,哦,我们想改变存储这些数据的方式,以便更好地了解这个收入运营系统的作用。你知道,诸如此类的事情。是的。现在每个人都能访问了。而我们团队的一位工程师只需要审核这个变更,是的。你知道,批准它。而且我觉得这也让 Linear 这个产品和我们所做的工作对他们来说更加易于使用。但是,是的,这需要时间。
34:30 是的。是的。就像任何事情一样。所以你的……比如,你的团队构成在变化吗?因为现在你有了不同的团队,比如,把文案更新推送到网站上,而这在以前可能不会做。也许,比如,你是否看到,比如,客户团队的构成在变化,因为也许,比如,他们使用 Linear 的方式,或者只是,比如,是的。只是代理式开发,比如,总体上?是的。我的意思是,我认为今天人们谈论很多的一件事是……实际上是团队如何变化,即它们保持更小、更扁平,等等。我觉得我见过很多公司,比如,在一段时间内以这种方式为目标,然后它们就,比如,发展得超出了这种方式。而且是的。而且它会变化。我认为幸运的是,比如,随着我们领域中的许多这些发展正在发生,比如,Linear 已经以这种方式运作,而且我认为它继续以这种方式运作。其中很多,你知道,可以归因于 AI。但我认为作为一个例子,你知道,其他团队的做法不同。我认为我们从未有过 SDR,作为一个例子。而且我认为这源于一种信念,即比如,销售人员应该能够,比如,写一封外联邮件。比如,我不明白为什么。比如……那么 SDR 通常做什么?通常,他们,比如,要么对新潜在客户进行外联,试图让他们进入销售管道,要么在客户进来时对他们进行资格审核。所以他们会做,比如,第一次通话。但不幸的是,那第一次通话非常,比如,对客户没有用,因为,你是第二个,只是像,那么你有多大?而且,比如,你觉得你可能能付给我们多少钱?对吧?而且再次,比如,我们的客户会讨厌参加那样的通话。他们会说,你为什么问我问题?你应该给我一个演示。
36:00 是的。对吧?比如,为什么我要在这通电话上浪费三十分钟,只是为了找到一个能给我演示的人?对吧?所以,你知道,我们没有那个职能,因为我认为它对我们的客户效果不好。但也因为你可以创建系统和工具以及自动化,使 AE 更容易对客户进行外联。对吧?那感觉是定制且有用的。对吧?并且能够,比如,最终达到某种程度的互动。对吧?所以,你知道,那可能是我们和其他公司之间的一个不同之处。我认为我们,我认为我们也选择思考业务中可以拥有,比如,更少员工的领域。对吧?以及你可以用,比如,工具优化什么?所以我们的客户体验团队就是一个很好的例子。所以,你知道,我们可以使用哪些工具来自动起草给客户的回复,是的。那些写给我们的人。你不觉得,比如,让 LLM 给客户写东西,比如,会产生垃圾内容吗?比如,是的。比如,AI 垃圾内容?比如,你如何,你如何解决那个问题?是的。我的意思是,CX 团队,比如,人类是质量检查,我明白了。在那上面。对吧?所以我们没有让 AI 发送大量内容。比如,他们……比如,很多公司。其他公司可以这样做,而且那完全没问题。对吧?不,不怪其他人。但很多其他公司会说,嘿,比如,进入我们支持团队的问题 100% 会,比如,首先由 LLM 回答。
37:30 是的。只有当客户愤怒地回信时,才会有人类介入说,哦,抱歉。是的。让我给你一个真正的答复。对吧?我们根本不认同那种模式。对吧?所以我更希望让 AI 根据它掌握的知识,针对具体问题起草一个答复。然后由人类来判断,这个答复好不好?但很多时候情况是,天哪,这本来三句话就能说清楚。结果我却收到了三段式的回复,最终并不是最有帮助的。对吧?我们在支持方面收到大量反馈,人们会说……几乎要么是“这是 AI 吗,因为你的回复太快了”。是的。而我们……你知道,我们团队真的很快。是的。所以人们以为这是 AI,因为它来得太快了。然后第二点是,哇。这像是我很久以来第一次和支持团队有这么好的互动。这有点可悲,你知道,对于其他工具和产品来说。但对我们来说,这是我们团队值得大力赞扬的事情之一,因为它树立了品牌印象。有时是在客户生命周期的早期,有时是他们已经和我们合作多年,第一次来联系,这会让他们真正感到自信,觉得自己做出了正确的决定。对吧?所以我认为你可以使用这些工具。它们是工具。我不认同盲目使用这些工具,以至于让你的……比如损害你的品牌。是的。最终让你的团队觉得它……几乎变得不那么有用或知识不足。是的。因为它依赖一个工具来拥有本应由人类拥有的全部知识。
39:00 是的。所以你……你提到过,比如缩减客户体验团队?所以……不是缩减。但我不认为我们会像没有这些工具时那样扩充团队。对吧?所以我认为其中一些工具非常有帮助,让我们不必总是随着业务增长的速度线性地扩充团队。是的。对吧?而且,你知道,我认为在业务的其他部分,比如市场营销和其他领域,情况是,哦,好的。我们可以为客户故事采访客户。我们可以有一个 AI 工具,比如转录这次采访,提取一些最引人注目的片段,但我们仍然由人类来写故事。对吧?是的。所以只是决定你要在哪里使用它,我们不喜欢很多 AI 写作的感觉。是的。所以,你知道,我们一直……嗯,比如用它来帮助我们找到与客户共度的两小时中有趣的部分。是的。但在很多方面,要让它感觉像我们希望 Linear 给人的感觉,也就是定制和手工打造。你知道,我们不应该在某些类型的事情上使用那些工具。
40:30 是的。至少在他们变得更好之前是这样。所以……我最近注意到,Astra 在写作方面相当不错。是的。但不管怎样,是的。是的。那么……比如,售前工程师是如何融入你的团队的……融入销售团队的?是的。是的。所以我们有所谓的解决方案工程师。哦,抱歉。他们实际上是一回事。他们有点像我们企业客户主管以及增长业务中较高端客户的合作伙伴。因此,当客户有非常深入的工作流问题时,他们会花大量时间与销售团队在一起。或者他们在想,嘿,我要和这边这个工具集成,比如一个非常定制的 API 集成。我该怎么把它迁移到 Linear?对吧?所以你在问一个有更深技术问题的人。是的。对吧?或者我该如何把 3 万人从一个遗留工具迁移到 Linear?是的。对吧?所以,你知道,解决方案工程师可以带着技术思维介入。就像,你知道,这些人全都可以……而他们交谈的对象大概也是一名工程师?是的。是的。几乎总是。所以,你知道,那个人有非常详细的问题。有时我们团队的人会构建完整的端到端演示,比如,哦,你想看看我们如何与 ServiceNow 集成?其实我昨晚就构建了这个 ServiceNow 集成。让我展示给你看。所以这也让客户正在经历的许多这类过渡变得非常容易,因为客户开始看到,哇,这些事情是可以非常快速地完成的。迁移并没有那么难。对吧?因为,你知道,这位工程师刚刚在一天内就构建了这个快速导入器。对吧?
42:00 Yeah. So sometimes we're we're helping customers along in the journey. We're typically not, like, going into their systems with access to their systems in a forward deployed engineering type of way, to, like, implement Linear. And I think a lot of that is like a philosophical belief. Like, we believe Linear should be easy enough for someone to integrate. Yeah. And, you know, we have competitors that have, you know, admins where their entire job is just managing that tool. And they are dedicated tool people within companies. Yeah. And, again, I think that works fine for products that are like almost infinitely customizable. Yeah. Right? But Linear is not that. Right? We tend to be far more of a purpose built tool. So we have, you know, pretty clear ways of doing things within Linear, but I also think that makes things far easier for agents to understand. Right? A lot of people are coming to Linear from other tools where, like, you know, bug as a label for this one team means something, and for another team means something else. And you can do that because bunch of different teams can work in, like, completely different ways, but it means that, like, the data is very difficult to discern. And so, you know, we're finding that with our system, it's just far easier for, like, agents to read and understand and work with as a result of some of these things. So I think the combination of, like, having that and then having, like, a technical counterpart to a salesperson... And often, like, our salespeople are working with people who are, like, you know, we have, a champion in the company, and they're saying, like, Linear is amazing, but I can't convince, like, this other person.
43:30 Can you help me? Right? You know, the IT person or the procurement person or, you know, someone else who's often not in the tool day to day. Yeah. Right? So maybe doesn't understand the challenges. And our salespeople are basically like advocates for that person and are like, okay. What can I do to help you sell internally? Right? And, you know, engineers are often not used to being like, need to sell other people within my company about this tool. Right? So that's like a learned skill that we can often help with. And and we find our salespeople are in, you know, kind of interesting positions, helping advocate for Linear through other people. Just curious, like, how long does it... Like, do you have a rule of thumb for how long it takes for, like, a case like that to, you know, get that customer to actually buy? Like, when, you know, they have to go to, I don't know, someone who has decision making authority? Yeah. Like the champion. Sorry.
45:00 Yeah. Sure. I mean, I think sometimes a decision can start from like one person. We've seen this. And then they get the buy in of the CEO, and the CEO just makes a top down decision. And it's like, we're moving a Linear over the weekend. Like, get used to it or get out. You know? And it's very, like, you know, dictatorial around, like, the decision that's being made. And those decisions can happen, like, in a month. Right? And those are, like, smaller companies I'm If you get... I mean, that... We had that happen, though, at a 1,000 person So, you know, again, it's just like if you have a CEO who is like, you know, I'm less of that type of person. Like, if I think my team should use a tool, I'll be like, why don't you all evaluate it and decide for yourselves? Right? Other companies work in very different ways. Right? So, you know, you have to think about, like, the politics of given organization, and every organization is inherently political in some shape or form. And then, you know, how do you ultimately, like, work this decision into a favorable way, you know Yeah. For your business. But, you know, then we'll see, like, companies. We we had one company that probably took two years, two and a half years or something. Like... And and it wasn't that they were in the sales pipeline the whole time. Yeah. It was like, they came in, oh, we couldn't convince the CTO. Like, and then they, you know, come in again, like, nine months later. Starts using me in the company. Yeah. Yeah. And then a different person comes in, like, nine months later, and it's like, I think we can convince the CTO now. Right? And then, you know, and it and it just takes, like, a really long time to finally get them to, like, approve and, like, make the decision. Sometimes it's budget. It's like, oh, we've already set the budget for this year. And if this is gonna require more spend, well, that's gonna be a 2028 Yeah. Decision. Right? Some companies operate like that.
46:30 Are you saying that like they're now operating like a lot faster because of the way like things are changing so fast now or not really still? Maybe like these more legacy companies? Yeah. I don't think they operate any faster, honestly. At least with decisions like this. Yeah. I would say for a lot of these companies, the things that... The thing that's helping them move faster is that like AI tools have effectively been like unblocked. Right? So if they believe that... The engineering team in particular believes that like this tool is going to make them better and it fits in like the AI budget. Yeah. For some companies, you know, that is maybe not infinite, but it is very high. Yeah. Whatever that budget is. And it was like, you know, add on budget that kind of had to come out of nowhere. Right? I think that's going to change. Yeah. It's starting to change for companies. But in a lot of ways, you if can like fit your company into that AI budget, then you are unlocking kind of budget that previously didn't exist. Right? And so that makes it far easier, I think, for companies to make a decision because like, oh, there is budget. We found... We've magically found budget that didn't previously exist before. Yeah. Know? Okay. So you think like a lot of this like AI companies are, you know, getting to a $100,000,000 of revenue within like three months? That's because of this basically. It's a lot of companies that previously didn't have budget for like experimenting with new tools. They're just kinda like, oh my god, our company's gonna die if we don't try any of these tools. So like, let's just experiment. And then, you know, at some point maybe a year from now, two years from now, that's gonna stop. Like they're experimenting right now and then, you know, they're gonna figure out what actually works, what doesn't.
48:00 I think I think a lot of companies are experimenting. And, you know, you're signing like one year deals maybe with companies or you're signing like pilot agreements with companies that have costs associated with them still. But you're not signing like a three year deal with a company because you're like, I don't know if I'm gonna like this. Yeah. You know, in two years, like, things are changing so rapidly. Is it normal for a company to sign a three year deal? If you're trusted Yeah. Like, we we sometimes sign very long term deals for that reason. It has trade offs. Right? Like, we can't move up our prices Oh, yeah. In that three year period of time unless you have, like, step ups built in to the agreement. But you know that you have that committed revenue. Right? So, you know, like... And for the business, the same is true. They feel like maybe they're getting a discount Yeah. For, you know, three years that they wouldn't have otherwise been getting. But but I would say like to the example you you had, I mean, I think a lot of those businesses are are very concentrated in the customers that we have. Right? So it's very different, I think, to be like a business like Linear that is, you know, 40,000 paying customers. Right? And like, historically, up until June was like an entirely seat based business. Right? Much harder to, like, grow revenue to, like, from zero to a 100 Yeah. Million overnight. Right?
49:30 And then, you know, you see companies where, I don't know, you sell to, the defense industry or you sell to, like, gigantic law firms or, you know, something like that. Yeah. And, you know, you sign a few deals that are, like, 30 to $40,000,000 in ARR. And then, okay. Great. We got to a 100,000,000 ARR. Yeah. Right? So, you know, certain kinds of businesses do have, like, more of that profile. So you're usage based now? We have some features that are usage based in terms of how we charge for them. Yeah. So how do you how do you convince your customers that that's that's a good idea to go from, like, seat based to usage based? Yeah. Is that hard to convince them? Yeah. I mean, I I would say, like, a lot of companies that are in, you know, the SaaS world Yeah. Are are certainly moving to usage based pricing. I think everyone would love for there to be like... Almost like the Intercom Fin model that existed for a long period of time where... Which was like, oh, if AI responds to your support ticket, like, you know, that costs a dollar. Yeah. And and you're like, is every support ticket that gets replied to, like, worth a dollar? Yeah. Like, okay. Great. Like, right? So you're you're pricing on, like, the outcome that you drive. Right? Think I it's a lot harder for other types of businesses to be like, okay. So what is automatically triaging this bug to the right team worth?
51:00 Yeah. Right? Maybe to every company, that's a little different. Maybe you believe, oh, that's the PM's job. Like, they they should be, like, you know, triaging bugs into the right queue, right, to the right person. And, you know, maybe another company says, well, I'd want my PM to spend their time talking to customers and, you know, building the product roadmap and doing other things instead. So I think there can sometimes be a debate in functions that are not very clearly outcome oriented, how you charge for usage based pricing. Mhmm. So I would love for there to be a world where, like, there's some kind of, like, outcome based model that makes sense for our world. I don't know that there is. So, you know, for now, we're mostly charging, you know, based off of like costs that we incur to run our services. Mhmm. And in some cases, those costs can be, you know, pretty high. Yeah. If you're running like a coding session in Linear or if you're doing things like, you know, run through my entire backlog and tell me what I should work on next. You know? You could have a very large backlog of a lot of things. Right? So, you know, those kinds of even just like chat questions to the agent can be like more expensive. We've decided to make certain things free. So like, you know, Linear agent chat conversations free, and we think we can continue to drive down the costs for that over time. You guys are using like open source models for that?
52:30 Right now, we're using Frontier. Okay. Even for the chat. Even for the chat. Okay. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. And, you know, TBD what the future holds there. And then beyond that, when you have a coding session in Linear, you can choose between like right now, OpenAI or Anthropic, models and harnesses. And the user ultimately gets to decide there and we charge basically by saying, like, here's what we were charged from the API. Here's the published rate and we charge like a little bit on top of that. Mhmm. And that's it. So making it very clear and transparent Yeah. For most users. And then for products like Loops, we have an AI credits model as well for that feature. So, you know, for everything else, it's a little different. The vast majority of our AI features are just like baked into Linear and you don't have to pay extra for them. So... How do you, like, how do you go about going to your customer and saying, hey, previously you guys were doing seat based pricing and now we're gonna do this? Yeah. I mean, I think it helps that, like, the seat based pricing isn't going away. Right? Like, so you're still paying for the core service, and we are not charging for things that were previously otherwise free. Oh, I see. Right? So it's it's very different, I think, when you go to a customer and you're like, So, like, what was free is now paid and usage based. Are, like, new features, basically. Yeah. Exactly. So sometimes we'll have a feature that's in a beta period, and we don't exactly know what it's going to cost or how to charge for it with usage based pricing because like, you know, you can, for example, run a very expensive Linear agent query and you could run a very inexpensive one. Right?
54:00 Yeah. So charging based purely off of like, you know, $1 per per query, like, wouldn't make sense in in that world. Right? So sometimes you just need to let customers, like, play with a new product to determine, like, what it's going to cost Mhmm. And what the best pricing model is. So typically, what we'll do is we'll have, a feature that's in beta, and we'll say, hey, this is an AI feature in beta. You know, we expect that we will charge for this in the future. But right now, it's free. Mhmm. Like, feel free to use it. See if you get value out of it. Give us feedback. And then we're... When we're ready to charge for it, we will let you know and give you notice. And I think that's worked generally, like, pretty well for us so far. And, you know, just trying to make sure that we're very clear with our customers. Sometimes, you know, we can have a six month beta period and then five months later, you're like, oh, I totally forgot that this was free. And in beta, I'm gonna be charged for it, and I'm disappointed. Right? It's hard... You know, there's nothing we could have done other than, you know, I don't know, warning banners in our product like, you are using a free feature that will soon be paid. There's only so much you can do about that. But I think just trying to, like, be open and honest with your customers that, we don't know what the business model is for this. Yeah. Like, we know we're going to charge for it because it's expense... It's an expensive product to serve to you. But we are going to try and, be as transparent as possible. And, you know, we hope you trust us. Right? And hopefully, like, every time one of these things happens, you are building more trust over time. I'll also say we tend to bias towards making things like more expensive at the start and then decreasing costs rather than like making things really cheap and then being like, oops. Like, actually, we can't solve... Like, serve this product for that cheap. Right? So just being like conservative in that way and where we are, like, able to lower cost for customers so that we get more adoption, we will.
55:30 Yeah. So you mentioned earlier that, like, when you came in, you had this, like, six, twelve month, like, go to market plan. Did you basically follow that go to market plan, like, to a tee, or did you have to change it along the way? And then how did that change back in 2025 when you guys started building the new agents features? Yeah. Yeah. I think I probably did every... I mean, I haven't looked at it in a while. Yeah. But I think I probably did everything, you know, for the most part, at least certainly at this point. Maybe I didn't do it all in the six to twelve month period that I thought I would. But a lot of it was like team building, hiring, you know, starting to think about launches, like product launches in a much more robust way. Like, you don't just, like, ship something and, like, move on to the next feature. You have to, like, continuously educate and and market products over time. So we think a lot of those things we've, like, adopted into, like, new make motions and ways of doing things for the team. And, you know, we certainly... And we went from, like, no sales team almost to to it being a very large percentage of the company now. So so, you know, I think a lot of those things have, like, ultimately, you know, shipped and and gotten out the door. And what was the second part of your question? It was like, how did you have to change that go to market strategy back in twenty twenty twenty twenty five when, like, the agents features came out?
57:00 Yeah. I think a lot of it was just, you know, sometimes, I think from a go to market perspective, you have a you have a long term road map. Right? And, you know, a lot of those things at the time were like enterprise features and other things to kind of help us go up market. And that was also... 2025 was a year where we said we were going after enterprise. Right? And then we saw everything that was happening in this space, and we're like, oh, we've gotta build an MCP server. Oh, we've gotta build an agent's platform with a whole new set of APIs. So anyone can build an agent into Linear. Oh, we've gotta build partnerships with like Codex and Cursor, and GitHub Copilot. So all of these agents are in Linear. And we did all of those things, but none of those things were planned. Like, we did not know we were going to do any of those things at the beginning of 2025. So that doesn't mean we did all of that and everything else that we planned for. It meant that, like, a bunch of the enterprise stuff that we planned for, you know, didn't get done. Yeah. So Meaning, like, there were, like, certain customers you were trying to go after? Or Like certain features that we wanted to build for, you know, workspaces that were of a certain size that would, like, you know, help us scale to like larger and larger organizations. And, you know, again, a lot of those things didn't get done. But I looked at it and I said, well, do we wanna be like behind all of this new stuff or do we wanna be like really racing ahead of where we think we should be? I think we chose to say like, no. We're gonna race ahead. And I think I also believed that if we did that and we did it well, that it would also win us new enterprise customers, just not in the way that we thought we would win them.
58:30 Yeah. Right? It wasn't gonna be about, you know, building, like, sub teams and multilayer, like, work streams, like roadmaps that work across multiple different teams, which you might want if you're a large organization. Right? No. It was more about, you know, building these things that make Linear work really well with agents. And, you know, because we built that and and our competitors, you know, waited a long time to do the same thing, I think we got ahead in a way that we wouldn't have otherwise. And a lot of enterprises put Linear on the list to be considered that wouldn't have otherwise. If you could go back to when you first started at Linear, knowing what you know now, like, what what would you tell yourself? Or what do you wish you knew? I feel like I probably go back and be like, you know, calm down. It'll all be fun. Like, it's probably what I would say. And what I mean by that, what that's, like, really alluding to is when I joined Linear in 2023, the startup market was not doing well. Right? Had all these dbt just came out. You had all these companies, yeah, in, like, 2021 and 2022 that raised these, like, gigantic funding rounds and were doing really well, you know, as we were kind of coming out of COVID. And then in 2023, like, it was the great, like, startup culling. Like, companies couldn't really get funded. A lot of companies were, like, cutting costs, like dramatically, trying to consolidate spend. So in in that world, it, you know, it was like much harder to grow, especially when in 2023, we were focused on startups. And then like growth stage companies a little bit. Right? So, you know, I think in a lot of ways, sometimes you enter into a space in like a market that's hard.
1:00:00 Right? Luckily, it was hard for everybody else too. So, you know, it wasn't like, you know, it was, you know, disproportionate in a way. But, you know, it did, like, affect the business. And, you know, you're trying to figure out ways to grow without that natural growth where you would have otherwise gotten. Mhmm. And then I think similarly with, like, all of the agentic development and the way that things have changed. Like, you you have to have a similar approach of saying, like, like trust in, like, engineering and product and design to build the products that they would wanna see Yeah. In the world. And we will build a business model around whatever that is. Yeah. Right? And it's not our job to exactly predict the future. And I think now we like, you know, we have a product roadmap that goes out max like six months because, you know, who knows how things are going to change. Right? And I think that really helps to say, okay. We're gonna create a story for, like, how the world is right now.
1:01:30 And we can expect that that story is gonna last for, like, six months from like a marketing perspective. And then it's probably going to evolve and change. And we shouldn't be afraid of being like, oh, no. We had this billboard that was like supposed to go up that had this other message, and maybe that message isn't right anymore. And it's like, yeah. You gotta just like move and change. And, you know, it's all gonna be okay. Right? But, like, you just don't have the same time to like plan a message, plan a strategy, like execute it perfectly as you used to, like, in the old world. So I think this new world, like, ultimately rewards speed and operating in a very different way. So, like, stay close to your customers. Focus would be like what I would go back. Do you think this is like a temporary moment in time, or this is just the way that it's going to be now? Like, things are just gonna continue changing, like, super, super fast. Yeah. I think it's the way that it's going to be. Yeah. I mean, I said this about the summer of twenty twenty five, where normally, like, in Linear's business, summer slows down because your customers go on vacation. Yeah. They don't buy things. They don't enter into, like, new procurement processes. Right? And and so I was expecting, like, what it was like in 2024 to be like it wasn't 2025. And I was like, this is not Yeah. This is not that. We are we are going full throttle. It used to be that companies, like, wouldn't launch products or, like, have conferences in the summer or, like, do any of these things. And now it's like, no. I'm... We're just gonna get up on, like, a stream and, like, launch something right now with, like, a week's notice.
1:03:00 Yeah. Right? And it used to matter that you, like, shouldn't launch on Fridays and shouldn't launch on Mondays. Now, who cares? You can launch on Saturday. Doesn't really matter. So just like all of those rules, I I would say, like, have gone out the window because there's so much launching and so much happening. And I don't see that changing for a while until there's like a consolidation moment in AI. Yeah. Also, like, everyone always talks about what's your moat? What's your moat like as a business? What would you say maybe the moat of Linear was like when you first started out and maybe like what it is now? Probably great design, great UX. Yeah. I would say now that it actually probably was, like, great team. And now it... I'm like, great team. Yeah. I would say speed maybe, would you say? Yeah. In a way. Just I mean, I think in a in a... It's hard because I think for a... Like, we care so much about quality. Yeah. We are often the company that will, like, delay a launch to get to, like, a certain level of quality. So we are not the flat... Fastest, but it also means we're not, like, the sloppiest Yeah. In a way. So we're hitting that fine line, basically. Right. But, like, compared to, like, legacy companies. Like, yeah, we're fast. Right? But, like, you know, it's all a spectrum. Yeah. Right? So I think in a lot of ways, like, for who we're competing against, you know, there's, like, the right trade off between, like, quality and speed. And for every company, that's different. Right? Yeah. I think we're higher, like, on the quality end, but still try to be fast and, like, cut scope, like, where it makes sense. Yeah. But I think, like, I think a lot of the moats in business, like, have kind of, like, crumbled away. Yeah. And the reality is that you just need to have a team that, like, has a really good sense, a really good pulse of like what's coming, what's changing, and you are investing in your team and your people to be able to figure it out. Yeah. Because, you know, yesterday, this model is the best. Tomorrow, this other model is the best. Like, a company you hadn't heard of, like, two months ago is now raising at $10,000,000,000. Yeah. Right. Like, so everything can change. Yeah.
1:04:30 Which means, like, we should all be very paranoid in a lot of ways because like, you know, the business that you had is not necessarily going to be, you know, the business that you have in the future. But I think what people are investing in is like a team and a way of doing things that is the future no matter what the future holds. Yeah. I I always find that question to startups is like dumb. It's like you're a startup because you're trying to beat incumbents. Like they have maybe a moat, like looking back, but if you like you don't have a moat when you just start a business. Right? It doesn't make any sense. Right. Anyway, earlier you also mentioned that like you guys were kinda like going stepwise where you were, you know, selling the startups and then you were like, oh, we can't just immediately go sell to, like, giant enterprises. We only had, like, one salesperson. Why not then just hire, you know, a 100 salespeople and just go straight for those?
1:06:00 It just... It wouldn't be the Linear philosophy or way of doing things. Yeah. Right? I think we've always operated with the, like, do more with less. Like, we would be a company with, like like, if you look at most companies that are stage and revenue, they have teams that are almost double the size in terms of headcount. And I think we are able to do a lot more with less. That also means that we can be a lot more nimble than other companies because you're not moving this, like, gigantic ship whenever you need to change direction. But I don't think we would have done well with, like, having a sales team that was bigger than, like, the entire company. You know? So, you know, I think at the beginning, I think... And this was true when I was at Stripe too. Like, there was this impression of salespeople that I think for a lot of tech companies can be pretty negative. Right? It's like, oh, like, who are these people? These, like, car salesman Yeah. Coming in to, like, sell our product. I never thought about it that way. We don't think about it that way at Linear, but that was like maybe the impression of salespeople maybe of like, you know, tech in the twenty twelves. You know? I view it very differently because I do believe that like sales has a lot of power to help inflect a business that requires human interaction Yeah. And persuasion. And I I would say that, like, for us, you know, doing it small and steady built the kind of trust that was required in different parts of the organization.
1:07:30 So like engineering really trusts sales. Like when our sales team is like having trouble in a particular segment and, you know, gets on calls with, like, PMs on our team and things like that. Like, there's a lot of trust in that salesperson really understanding the need of the customer, what they're asking for, sometimes even helping solution when necessary. I don't think he would have done that. Like, we would have been able to do that particularly well by hiring a ton of people really quickly. And again, a lot of startups take that approach, but I think they have probably more of like a hire fast, fire fast Yeah. Type of mentality. And I think with hiring, you know, we do work trials. Like, what signal does that send to you? That signal sends to you. Like, we like to, take our time and really understand if someone's a good fit. We want to get them into the, problem scope that Linear operates in and test to see, like, that their great experience somewhere else is going to translate well into our company. You know? So I think it's like a philosophy difference and, you know, every company does things differently. And I would say a lot of the great companies, you know, in the world do things their own way for a reason. Yeah. Do you guys take inspiration from any other companies?
1:09:00 I mean, I I spent seven and a half years at Stripe. And certainly, there are things I take inspiration from. I'll give an example. What... Because we were talking about hiring. You know, at a certain point, we were hiring, like, business people at Stripe faster than we were hiring, like, engineers and product folks and designers. And, you know, the founders were like, this has to come to a stop. Right? And it's like, well, you know, what kind of, you know, ratio would you like? Right? So you then take a step back and you're like, yeah. What what do we want this company to be? If we want this company to be like an engineering and product driven company, probably at least like 40% of the company should be like engineering product design, data, etcetera. And so we basically were like, okay. That's the, like, watermark. And, like, we can't It was just like an arbitrary number. Like It was 40%. 40%. And it was like, we can't go under that number. So if sales wants to hire more people, have sales help us hire engineers so that sales can then hire more people. I see. Right? And I think, like, yes, it's an arbitrary number, but I think it's important for you to understand, like, how do you want your company to be constructed? Right? Like, there are a lot of companies like... And Uber that are, like, heavy on operations, but that's because they're moving like humans and things. Right? We're a very different kind of company. We're like a software business. Right? And for us, we don't necessarily have to have, like, an operations component of the business that is, like, that huge because we're not dealing with those kinds situations. So like understand your business really well, understand what you want to be, and then figure out what model makes sense for you. So like, we don't have like that hard and fast rule at Linear of like 40%, but like I I watch that number. I like created a headcount spreadsheet. Was, like, one of the first things I did. Like, put everyone into their categories of, like, what function they're in, like, calculated the percentage, and, like, you know, I watch it.
1:10:30 And I'm, like, we really need to, like, step up our game on, like, engineering recruiting. It is always going to be harder to hire engineers than it's going to be to hire salespeople. Yeah. And so, like, what are we going to do to like make that easier for us? So a lot of it is just like the philosophy and what you want to be. And knowing that I've been at companies that like, you know, wanna do things the same way, but also, you know, for example, don't wanna outsource support or, you know, wanna treat different aspects of the product in a different way. And I think that's the challenge. There are a lot of things that like I get to bring with me from like my previous experience. And then at the same time, there are a lot of things that I wanna do in a new way that I haven't seen anyone else do. Yeah. I was gonna ask that next. Like, were there like certain things that you specifically did not wanna bring over from like Stripe or Notion? Maybe one example. I think I think Stripe did so well as a company that I think in a lot of ways when, you know, you're a 140, $160,000,000,000 company and you're like on that rise, sometimes you believe you can always hire better than what you have today. So you have a leader in a given function that's doing well. And sometimes your first reaction to that could be like, well, it's because the business is doing well, not because that person necessarily is that great. Yeah.
1:12:00 And it's It's like, oh, I'm at Google. I helped increase revenue by, you know, $20,000,000,000. Exactly. But what did you really do? Right? And and so sometimes it goes really well. Is it, you know, because of that person or is it because the business was going really well? And then if the company is doing so well that you can attract really high quality talent. Right? So someone like two levels above that person, and then a year later, you're able to attract a person who's two levels above that person. And... Right? You're kind of always going to be seeking, like, someone better than who you haven't seen because you can. And I think, like, for a lot of companies, like, being able to say, like like, I've said this to our founders. I'm like, we can get someone better. Like, we're a good company. Company that people want to work for and then are excited about. Like, we don't have to settle. Right? And I think that's, like, great. And then at the same time, sometimes you also have to, like, really recognize, like, the great people that you have. And I think for Stripe, it took a longer time to, like, come around to that. Like, Stripe's been having a lot of, like, boomerangs. Like, you know, people left the company because maybe they, you know, weren't on the rise, you know, in the way that they wanted to be. And then, you know, came back and are doing like amazingly well. And I think sometimes I would like to look back on my time at Linear and say like the right people were, like, promoted and excelled. And we didn't hire above them unless the company needed to. Right? Unless we needed to get to that a different stage. We needed something that that person didn't have. And not just because, like, we weren't willing to let them try to, like, be better than they are, to, like, scale at that next stage. Because, you know, in running startups, this is true of founders. Like, you don't... Like, almost no founder who has a lot of success has, like, done it exactly before. Right? And that's probably going to be true of a lot of the early team. Like, they're leaders at the company, but they've never scaled a support team to like 200 people or 500 people or whatever. That doesn't mean that they can't. Right? Just like it doesn't mean that that founder can't be a great founder at a thousand people and also a great founder at like 50 people. Mhmm. And so, like, I just fundamentally believe that like people can grow and scale, and that you should like reward that over time.
1:13:30 And, you know, I have some time... Like different parts of of the company, like, I'm like, I don't know if they always believe that. I I think... And I think a lot has changed since then, for what it's worth. But maybe that's one thing. On support, that would be the other thing. I think it's incredibly difficult to scale support to that degree. And I think that we emphasize a higher level of quality than I've seen in vast majority of support organizations I've operated in. And so it's something that we care about. We're willing to pay more for it. And we believe it's like the right thing to do by our customers. And I love that I've literally never in three and a half years gotten an escalation because someone had a poor experience with our support team. So that's like a company that like I see and I love to be part of. Yeah. Know, and that's not true for every other company I've worked for.
1:15:00 So, okay, you were at Stripe, then you went to Notion for a little bit, and then you became an investor. Yes. Why did you make that transition to becoming an investor? Yeah. When I was at Notion, I enjoyed my job, but the parts that I enjoyed were almost the parts that I wasn't really hired to do. So I I joined around maybe 40 people or so, and we were, you know, we were scaling. We didn't have like a single recruiter. We didn't have a head of people. We didn't have anyone working on growth. So, you know, what did I do? I, like, raised my hand and was like, I'll help hire our head of people. Like, I'll help hire our first recruiter. I'll find our first product manager and, like, hire them. And I did all of those things, and then I kind of, like, hired my way out of, like, jobs that I had. Right? And then got to a point where I was like, wait. I'm, like, back at the job. I was, like, actually hired to do. Yeah. Like, I don't really Which was what? Like, head of platform and partnerships. Okay. And I was like, I'm not really excited about this job anymore. Like, I was having more fun doing all that other stuff Yeah. That I wasn't really hired to do. But it's just like, it's company building. Mhmm. Right?
1:16:30 And at the time, I was just like, I I I think I need a new role at like a different company. And I don't know what that role exactly looks like. Right? And so I thought that venture might be a great way to kind of get the breadth that I was looking for, really, by spending time with, like, a bunch of different kinds of companies in different spaces. And, you know, I think for me, it's it's it's very different being an investor than, like, coming into a company and actually doing the work. Mhmm. It's really, like, different to, like, advise a company like, oh, you should go spend more time with your customers. And you, you know, should think about this business model or, you know And you were doing early stage? Or Early stage. Yeah. And a lot of the early stage stuff is like you're investing like pre product market fit. And like, I don't know anything about your market. Like, you sell to like, I don't know, procurement leaders or like construction workers or like like, you know, you have to be in that to really understand. And I actually felt like I was more helpful when companies had that product market fit. If I think about every single company I've ever joined, it like just was finding like product market fit, and then I joined. And then I can be a lot more helpful and like build out the business. But, you know, I think for pre product market fit, a lot of it's just like investing in the right people and like getting out of the way. Yeah. And being supportive and helpful with intros and things like that. But what I... Like, I actually really love execution. Yeah. Being inside a company and, like, helping get stuff done. And I think I'm kind of known as a person who will, like, run through walls to get things done even, you know, if that might rub people the wrong way in certain larger organizations. But, you know, for a startup, it works really well. Yeah. And so that's Are worked for
1:18:00 there certain things that you noticed, like being an operator made you a better investor at? And then also vice versa, like what did you learn from being an investor that made you better at, you know, your current role at Yeah. At Linear? I think I was speaking from, like, a place of, like, knowledge and truth. And I think a lot of investors have, like, never worked at a startup before. And there's nothing wrong with that. You can be an amazing... They're amazing investors who've never worked at a startup before, and it doesn't matter. Like, you invest in the right people. And, again, let them do their thing. And, you know, as long as you invest in the right people, that strategy works. Right? But, you know, I think also doing VC is sales. Like, you are selling money. And every other investor, like, has money to sell too. Right? So you're kind of selling the same product in some ways, but you are trying to sell yourself. Right? And, like, you are trying to differentiate yourself as a product beyond the money to that founder. And I found it much easier as someone who had, like, been operating at some great companies to be able to go to a founder and say, like, I can credibly help your business. Yeah. What would maybe other investors could.
1:19:30 What would be, like, the the pitch for an investor who's never worked at a company? It'd be, like, oh, I have a lot of intros. I've already invested in a lot of like really cool companies. Is that like kinda their selling point? I think a lot of it is like sometimes like pattern matching. Right? Like I've been on the boards of these great companies and I've seen success from zero to, you know, a 100 or whatever. It may have been several times over. And, you know, maybe I can tell you when it's time to do x or when it's time to do y because I've pattern matched my way here. I, you know, in a lot of cases, you work with certain investors and they have, like, a very large Rolodex. They know lots of great people at great companies and Yeah. You know, can introduce you to people who are more knowledgeable than they are in certain areas. So, you know, often investors will come to me and be like, can you help this founder who's team up building a sales team Yeah. You know, from zero? And, well, I can tell you about building it from one. You know? And, you know, because they know me, you know, that's like an access point that helps the founder. Right? So I think for every investor, it's like it's like something different. But, you know, what I take back now as, like, an investor, you know, going back into working at a company is, like, just having more of that understanding when I'm, like, in a board meeting, you know, of, like, what are the investors thinking? Like, oh, right. I I was an investor. Like, I I have a sense of, like, what they're thinking and what data they wanna see and what are the metrics that they care about. And if we're thinking about raising, like, a new round, like, what are my expectations for their help? If we need more customers, what are my expectations for, like, their introductions? And I have a better sense of, like, what I should be getting out of that person as an investor or board member or something like that. And I think that's, yeah, again, like helpful to the company in a lot of ways.
1:21:00 Yeah. I guess you're COO, so you have to, like, interface with investors a lot. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And, you know, we we work with some great investors and, you know, are very helpful and have referred people. But, know, in a lot of situations, like, closed mouths don't get fed. So if you don't ask for things, they're not gonna give them to you. Yeah. So... So Linear doesn't have any other c suite other than the founders in you? Yes. Why is that? It's a good question. I mean, I think, again, we we operated this way at Stripe for a very long time. So again, I take a bias towards it. But I think it's been true actually, for a lot of companies. Like, you might have, like, one executive who's, like, hired in on the business side who who has this title or something similar. And I would say at the beginning, a a lot of it is just, you know, my role is kind of a catchall for like a really small company for like lots of different functions and things over time. But I expect that to change. I don't think that's going to be like the way it is forever. You know, if we build out like the right team, you know, the right leadership in the right places, like people will earn that level of title. And I think for us right now, because we still feel so small, like we're about a 170 people, in a lot of ways, wanna remain pretty flat rather than, like, adding a lot of layers when we are still pretty small.
1:22:30 Yeah. And, I think that's been helpful for us so far. But that doesn't mean that we haven't, like, promoted people and given people more responsibility, more ownership, more scope. But we tend to focus on things like, you know, head of titles for, like, wide areas of ownership. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, that's all I had. Is there, like, any... Anything else that, you know, you wanted to talk about? No. No. This was a great conversation. I feel like we went into a lot of different different areas Cool. Of of of a business. So thanks. You had great questions. Yeah. Thank you.
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